An Empirical Test of the Dutch Disease Hypothesis using a Gravity Model of Trade by Jean-Philippe Stijns
COMMENTS HIGHLY APPRECIATED 
AN EMPIRICAL TEST OF THE DUTCH DISEASE HYPOTHESIS 
USING A GRAVITY MODEL OF TRADE 




University of California at Berkeley, Department of Econom ics 
 
First draft: September 2002. Current draft: May 2003. 
 
JEL: F12, F41, O13, Q33 
Keywords: Dutch disease, resource booms, gravity model, manufacturing exports, energy, trade, industry. 
 
Abstract 
Although the core model of the Dutch Disease makes unambiguous predictions regarding 
the negative effect of a resource boom on a country’s manufacturing exports, the 
empirical literature that has followed has not clearly identified this effect.  I attribute this 
to the failure of the existing literature to combine enough data to produce a sufficiently 
powerful and exogenous test.  I will use the World Trade Database to systematically test 
this hypothesis in a gravity model of trade.  World energy prices are used to bypass issues 
of endogeneity regarding primary ex ports.  A one percent increase in world energy price 
is estimated to decrease a net energy exporter’s real manufacturing exports by almost half 
a percent.  Similarly, after instrumentation, a one percent increase in an energy exporting 
country’s net energy exports  is estimated decrease the country’s real manufacturing 
exports by 8 percent.  The corresponding confidence intervals are tight and these results 
are shown to be quite robust. 
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“[…] in the words of Lord Kahn [1905-1989], ‘when the flow of North 
Sea oil and gas begins to diminish, about the turn of the [21
st] century, 
our island will become desolate.’ Any disease which threatens that kind 
of apocalypse deserves close attention.” 
“The Dutch Disease,” The Economist, November 26, 1977: pp-82-83. 
1  Introduction 
It is widely assumed in the literature that natural resource booms tend to harm the countries in which they 
occur.  Most famously, Sachs and Warner (1995) show that economies with a high ratio of natural resource 
exports to GDP in 1971 tended to have low growth rates during the subsequent period 1971-89.  This 
negative relationship holds true after controlling for other usual determinants of economic growth, such as 
initial per capita income, trade policy, government efficiency, and investment rates. 
Sachs and Warner  (1995)  conclude that “one of the surprising features of modern economic 
growth is that economies abundant in natural resources have tended to grow slower than economies without 
substantial natural resources.”  Such a statement deserves  careful scrutiny if only because of its 
implications for  both  development policy in the third world,  and  for  macroeconomic policy in 
industrialized countries.  At the same time, there is a growing debate among academics, development and 
environment related lobbyists and policy makers regarding whether or not resource abundant countries 
should be encouraged to exploit their resource bases. 
A growing literature  is dealing with an increasing number of  aspects of  the  “resource curse”.  
There are two main areas of active research
1.  The first can be termed the “political economy of mineral 
rent generation and distribution.”  The second covers the “general equilibrium effects of a minerals boom”, 
including the spending effects of the mineral rents.  This paper focuses on this second literature and what is 
probably the best-known and the most classical formulation of the resource curse hypothesis, namely the 
Dutch Disease — hereafter DD — hypothesis . 
In a nutshell, the DD primarily refers to a situation in which a booming export sector increases the 
relative price of non-tradable goods and services, thus hurting the rest of the tradable goods sector.  Its 
name arose from the effects attributed to the discoveries of North Sea gas on the Dutch manufacturing 
sector.  Corden and Neary  (1982) present  what has come to be known as  the “core model” of  DD 
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economics.  In this paper, I test systematically one of its main unambiguous testable hypotheses, one that 
has generated the most concern among economists, the hypothesis that resource booms lead to reductions 
in manufacturing exports, controlling for all other determinants of trade. 
There is a large literature on the empirics of the Dutch Disease.  This literature is mostly a 
collection of country — sometimes comparative — case-studies for the OECD and developing countries.  
Spatafora and Warner (1999, 2001) is the only exception.  Their dataset is composed of 18 oil-exporting 
developing countries covering a period running from the mid sixties to the eighties.  They find that Dutch 
Disease effects are  “strikingly absent” from their data.    However, there  exists,  to the best of  my best 
knowledge, no generalized cross-country econometric test of the consequences of resource booms on real 
manufacturing trade. 
The general conclusion of this literature is that there are symptoms of the Dutch Disease in most 
instances of a commodity boom but that it is very difficult to disentangle DD effects from the domestic and 
international macroeconomic conditions prevailing at the time of the shock.  Price led energy booms tend to 
be accompanied by (world-wide) recessions.  Hamilton (1983) is known to have most convincingly isolated 
this pattern for the United States and provides evidence that we can still expect this pattern to be at work 
(Hamilton, 1996).  Rotemberg and Woodford (1996) propose an explanation for the surprisingly strong 
elasticity of output to oil prices — a 10% oil price innovation is associated, five or six quarters later, with a 
2.5% decline in output — based on imperfect competition in product markets. 
I use a gravity model of manufacturing trade to control for the macro-economic circumstances 
faced at home and by trade partners, as well as other important geographic determinants of trade.  The 
choice for this particular model is due to its excellent empirical track record and its theoretical consistency 
with a variety of different views of trade.  This last characteristic will exempt me from having to adhere to 
any particular such view of trade.  In other words, I use the gravity model of trade as a reduced form of a 
potentially more complex structural model that I leave unspecified. 
Acknowledging the potential endogeneity of commodity exports to manufacturing trade, the world 
price of energy — in real terms — is used to identify price led oil booms.  Indeed, the world energy price 
can be safely assumed to be exogenous to any single country’s manufacturing exports. Yet these world AN EMPIRICAL TEST OF THE DUTCH DISEASE HYPOTHESIS 
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prices are highly correlated with domestic energy prices, and thus changes in value added in the energy 
sector.  They are therefore an ideal instrument variable for energy booms. 
Corden (1984) points out that a resource boom can take place in three different ways: first, there 
can be exogenous technological progress in the booming resource sector; second, the country can see a  
windfall discovery of some natural resources; third, there can be an exogenous rise in the world price of a 
natural resource exported by a country.  In this paper, I focus on this third kind of natural resource boom.  
Similarly, there  are potentially other forms of booms associated with types of  commodities other than 
energy.  This, of course, implies that there are potential cases of Dutch Disease that this paper will 
overlook.  Since the purpose is to show the existence of at least some form of Dutch Disease, I simply leave 
the identification of other forms of Dutch Disease as interesting paths for further research.  Future research 
will have to determine whether other types of booms and booms associated with other  kinds of 
commodities have similar effects to those identified here, if any. 
With this identifying assumption in hand, two types of elasticities are estimated.  First, the real 
energy price elasticity of manufacturing exports in net energy exporting countries is estimated to be, on 
average, close to minus ½.  In other words, a 1% increase in the price of energy will, everything else held 
constant, decrease a net energy exporter’s real manufacturing exports by half a percent.  Second, the net 
energy export elasticity of manufacturing exports, when instrumented by world oil prices, is minus 0.08.  In 
other words, a 1% increase in net energy exports will, everything else held constant, decrease a net energy 
exporter’s real manufacturing exports by one  eighth of a percent.   These elasticity estimates are very 
significant, and the corresponding confidence intervals are tight. 
I conduct extensive sensitivity analysis and these “benchmark” results turn out to be quite robust.  
They are robust to the introduction of country specific fixed effects on top of country pair fixed effects.  
This eliminates the concern for the corresponding type of omitted variable bias.  Censored tobit regressions 
reveal that results are not dependent on the presence or treatment of small export observations.  Results are 
also robust to changes in the currency unit of measurement.  Outlier analysis reveals that results are not 
significantly dependent on any country or country pair.  Further, the main conclusions of this paper are not 
dependent on the inclusion of any geographical group of countries, or set of countries characterized by a 
specific type of effective exchange rate regime. AN EMPIRICAL TEST OF THE DUTCH DISEASE HYPOTHESIS 
Page 5 of 43 
In contrast with the existing literature, I find strong evidence of the DD in the world trade data.  
Price-led energy booms, systematically tend to hurt energy exporters’ manufacturing exports.  This paper 
dispels doubts about the empirical relevance of the DD.  It is intuitive, after all, that when juxtaposing the 
marginally convincing evidence found in numerous countries, one be able to either reject or accept the DD 
hypothesis
2. 
One should be careful not to over-interpret the results reported in this paper, however.  In most 
cases, booms result in increased GDP levels, and hence increased welfare, for energy producers.  This is not 
the question in this paper.  Further, one only needs to worry about the DD insofar as there is indeed 
something desirable about having a large proportion of manufacturing exports.  There is, indeed, evidence 
that productivity growth can sometimes be very strong in resource extraction industries,  both in 
industrialized and developing countries.  In addition, the role that manufacturing plays vis-à-vis the primary 
sector can vary from country to country, for example, because of factor intensity reversal. 
On the other hand, there is a widespread assumption in the structural tradition of the development 
literature that industrialization should be per se a development goal.  More recently, Matsuyama (1992), 
Sachs and Warner (1995, 1999), and their followers, h ave explicitly modeled economic growth as a 
function of the relative size of the manufacturing sector.  It is not the purpose of this paper to settle this 
issue.  Rather, the statistic and economic significance of the result found here leads me to argue in favor of 
careful  future  empirical testing of the effect on productivity of sectoral changes in output and exports 
resulting from energy and other resource booms. 
This paper is organized as follows.  Section 2  reviews the theory and empirics of the Dutch 
Disease.  Section 3 describes the methodology and data.  Section 4 presents the main results.  Section 5 
proceeds with sensibility analysis followed by Section 6 that reports on outlier analysis.  I conclude in 
Section 7. 
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2  Literature Review 
2.1  The Dutch Disease theory 
The DD refers to a situation in which a boom in an export sector leads to a shift of production factors 
towards the booming sector and an increase in the prices of non-tradable goods and services, thus hurting 
the rest of the tradable goods sector.  Its name arose from the effects presumably caused by the discoveries 
of North Sea gas on the  Dutch manufacturing sector.  Corden (1984) notes that the term appears to have 
been coined in The Economist of November 26, 1977. 
Dorrance and Leeson (1997) trace the idea itself  back to Meade.  Meade  spent six months in 
Australia in 1956.  While there, he observed the effect of growth in Australia's resource exports, and 
identified what came to be called the DD (Corden, 1996).  The first paper approaching this question is 
actually by Meade and Russell (1957).  Corden (1984) and Corden and Neary (1982) are the cornerstones 
of a vast DD literature that developed around how a natural resource boom can trigger a process of “de-
industrialization”
3. 
Corden and Neary (1982) present what they call and what has come to be known as the “core 
model” of Dutch Disease economics
4.  They assume a small open economy that produces three goods: two 
are traded at exogenously given international prices;  the third is a non-traded good whose price is 
determined by domestic supply and demand.  The traded goods sector includes a booming good, and a non-
booming one.  The non-traded good is typically thought to be produced by the service sector (but it can be 
extended to the construction sector, etc).  The main model assumes capital to be sector specific whereas 
labor is assumed to be mobile.  A resource boom affects the rest of the economy in two main ways: the 
“resource movement effect” and the “spending effect”. 
On the supply-side, an exogenous increase in the value of the booming sector’s output raises the 
marginal product of labor in that sector.  A shift of labor to the booming sector from all other sectors will 
ensue and a contraction of the tradable sector will result from its reduced use of production factors.  This is 
the resource movement effect.  This factor movement also leads to an increase in the price of non-traded 
                                                                 
3 See Corden (1984) for a review of the early DD literature written in the 1970’s. 
4 The presentation made in this section of the “core model” of the DD is inspired from two very clear 
presentations by Adolfo Meisel Roca (1999) and Karlygash Kuralbayeva, Ali M. Kutan and Michael L. 
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goods since,  ex ante, it results  in excess demand for non-tradables.  Since the price of tradables  is 
exogenously determined in world markets, the rise in the prices of non-tradables is equivalent to an 
appreciation of the real exchange rate. 
On the demand side, the boom, leads to increased income at home and therefore, to increased 
demand for all goods.  Since the price of tradables is set on world markets, this extra spending raises the 
relative price of non-tradables, resulting in a further appreciation of the real exchange rate.  In response, 
labor  shifts from the tradables  sector  to the non-tradables sector resulting in a contraction of the non-
booming tradables sector.  This is the spending effect. 
With one specific non-mobile factor (capital) and one mobile factor (labor) in all sectors, both the 
resource movement  effect and the spending effect  imply a shift of  labor  away from the manufacturing 
sector, resulting in a n unambiguous decline in  manufacturing output
5.    The booming sector’s output 
increases since the value of output initially increases, and it absorbs ex post production factors coming from 
other sectors.  There is ambiguity regarding the change in non-tradable output.  The spending effect implies 
an expansion of this sector, yet the resource movement effect implies a contraction. 
The strength of the spending effect depends on the propensity to consume services.  Typically, 
when a resource boom occurs, increased government spending on construction and public services is likely 
to be the main channel for use of mineral rents.  Mineral states have been documented to lavishly spend 
their mineral revenues on numerous development projects and programs (see for example William Ascher, 
1999).   Hence, this marginal propensity to consume non-tradables will be high.  The strength of the 
resource movement effect depends on the factor intensity of each sector.  If the booming resource sector is 
the capital intensive sector — as is often the case in LDCs as well as in more industrialized countries, albeit 
to a lesser extent — the spending effect will dominate the resource movement effect. 
Corden and Neary  (1982)  call “direct deindustrialization” t he movement of labor from the 
manufacturing sector to the booming sector.  The flow of labor out of the non-tradable sector, together with 
the increased demand for goods from that sector due to the spending effect, causes a further shift of labor 
                                                                 
5 Corden and Neary (1982) show the implications of two other sets of assumptions about factor mobility 
between sectors.  One can assume that capital is mobile between the manufacturing and services sectors, or 
that capital is mobile among all three sectors.  In these cases, resource allocation cannot be determined 
without a prior knowledge of parameter values.  In the rest of this paper, given the lack of unambiguous 
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from the manufacturing sector to the non-tradable sector.  They refer to this second shift as “indirect de-
industrialization”.  For reasons related to those mentioned above, indirect industrialization is expected to be 
more important than direct deindustrialization. 
When the net effect of the spending and the resource movement effects are considered together, 
we obtain the following 4 main results: 
(R1)  The real exchange rate unambiguously appreciates
6; 
(R2)  There is a likely though theoretically ambiguous increase in non-traded output; 
(R3)  Production in the manufacturing sector unambiguously falls; 
(R4)  There is a fall in manufacturing exports. 
There are thus three unambiguous testable hypotheses.  I do not test for R1.  Instead I refer the reader to a 
recent contribution by Chen and Rogoff (2002).  They show R1 holds for the few mineral-rich countries 
they select for their data availability (even though that’s not enough to solve the PPP puzzle). 
In theory,  both  R2  and R3 are testable  hypotheses but sectoral production data is available  in 
reliably comparable form for only a few countries (mostly the OECD).  Regarding R2, there is little doubt 
throughout the DD literature that service output rises in response to resource booms (see Spatafora and 
Warner, 1999 and 2001 for the most systematic results).  In any case, testing an ambiguous implication of a 
model is unavoidably less attractive because it does not allow inferences regarding the general validity of 
the theoretical model itself.  In other words, finding supportive as well as dismissive evidence regarding R2 
would both be compatible with the DD model. 
In this paper, I will only test explicitly for  R4, principally because of the richness of trade data 
compared to the scarcity and unreliability of manufacturing production data comparable across countries.  
Under the hypotheses of the DD model, R3 implies R4, but it possible to imagine R4 without R3.  In other 
words, domestic production of manufactured goods could increase as a result of a resource boom while 
manufacturing exports  would  decrease: the hypothesis tested in this paper, R4, is necessary but not 
sufficient for R3. 
For this to happen, domestic demand for manufactured goods would have to grow  more than 
exports would have to shrink as a result of a resource boom.  Exports will turn out to be too strongly 
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affected by resource booms for  this to be plausible.  Had manufacturing exports only been  marginally 
affected by resource booms, the dichotomy between manufacturing production and exports would have 
been more important to highlight. 
In any case, many authors argue that international trade leads to firm-level learning about foreign 
technology and markets;  and so, independent of production, manufacturing exports slumps are often 
perceived as a concern of their own.  MacGarvie (2002) provides evidence of such learning effects using 
patent data citations.  Frankel and Romer (1999)  instrument trade across countries with  geographic 
variables,  and observe  that trade has a positive effect on income.  T hey conclude that their effect is 
economically significant and robust, albeit marginally significant from an econometric point of view. 
Finally, it should be noted that the DD effects discussed here are, of course, working on top of the 
rest of the shocks affecting the economy.  Specifically, declines in manufacturing exports in response to a 
resource boom have to be thought of against the background of their counterfactual.  The importance of a 
“ceteris paribus” analysis will be  illustrated when graphical e vidence  is examined, and will be further 
justified by an examination of the empirical DD literature. 
2.2  Existing Empirical literature 
What about the empirical relevance of the DD hypothesis?  There are two branches to this literature.  One 
covers resource-booms in OECD countries.  Corden (1984) surveys the early empirical literature on 
industrialized countries.  A general book referring to the “oil or industry” issue with respect to Canada, 
Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, and Britain was edited by Barker and Brailovsky (1981).  The other 
branch of the empirical DD literature studies resources booms in developing countries.  This second branch 
succeeded the other although there is some overlap.  McMahon (1997) reviews the results of eight different 
studies focusing on developing countries. 
In general, the development side of this literature tends to put more emphasis on rent-seeking 
behavior and poor governance whereas the original literature focuses more on prices and structural issues.  
This can be explained in part by the differing concerns each group of authors have.  In OECD countries, the 
concern is about ‘de-industrialization’  and the “ballooning role of the state”; many of these papers were 
also written in an era when economists were responding to the worry that the United States  was turning AN EMPIRICAL TEST OF THE DUTCH DISEASE HYPOTHESIS 
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into  “a  nation of hamburger flippers”, a process sometimes referred to as “servicesation”. Regarding 
developing countries, in the relative absence of industry, development economists are more concerned with 
‘de-agriculturization’ and detrimental effects on burgeoning social and political infrastructures of newly 
decolonized nations in particular.  I review each literature briefly in turn. 
The Netherlands 
In the late 1950s a very large deposit of natural gas was discovered in the north of The Netherlands.  
Development began in 1963 and by 1977 a country which had traditionally been a n energy importer 
became an energy exporter.  For Ellman (1981), cheap domestic energy seemed wholly favorable to the 
economy, at least into the late 1960s and early 1970s.  But during the 1970s, the guilder appreciated relative 
to most currencies.  The textiles and clothing industries almost vanished.  There was a decline in metal 
manufacturing, mechanical engineering, vehicles, ships, and even construction and building materials.  The 
service sector expanded noticeably, and seemed to be “taking over.” 
Corden (1984)  argues that  “the true  DD in the Netherlands was not the adverse effects on 
manufacturing of real appreciation but rather the use of booming sector revenues for social service levels 
which are not sustainable, but which have been politically difficult to reduce.”  Barker (1981) and Kremers 
(1985) conclude that it is difficult to “accuse” the gas discoveries of causing the severe decline in several 
Dutch manufacturing industries between 1973 and 1977.  Most of Western Europe was having a similar 
experience, most specifically Germany, the main trading partner of The Netherlands.  These countries were 
also witnessing substantial growth in unemployment. 
Figures I and II help compare the experience of The Netherlands with that of its trading partners.  
Generally, periods of increasing real energy prices correspond to periods of shrinking manufacturing 
exports as a share of GDP.  Conversely, real energy price crunches correspond to periods of increases of the 
share of manufacturing trade intensity.  However, the pattern observed in The Netherlands looks very 
similar to that of France and Germany which are not net energy exporters. 
Figure II plots manufacturing exports for the same four countries in real 1995 dollars, i.e. the real 
exchange rate index is applied to these series in order to capture the volume of manufacturing exports in the 
local currency equivalent.  Here again the Dutch experience is very similar to that of its main EC trading AN EMPIRICAL TEST OF THE DUTCH DISEASE HYPOTHESIS 
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partners.  In fact, French manufacturing exports take the worst dip although France is not an energy 
exporter. 
The United Kingdom 
In the United Kingdom, Ross (1986) reminds us that commercial production of oil started in 1975 when the 
(first) recession had already began.  The real exchange rate did appreciate by 51%-55% between 1977 and 
1980.  Manufacturing output dipped by 4% between 1973 and 1979 and by 14% between 1979 and 1982. 
However, it is difficult to hold oil responsible for the pound’s real appreciation.  Simultaneously, 
monetary policy was markedly tightened with, consequently, high nominal interest rates prevailing between 
1979 and 1981.  Further, the status of the pound as a ‘petrocurrency’ concurrently to high oil prices turned 
it into a secure haven, especially given the government’s tough deflationary stance. 
Buiter and Miller (1981, 1983) document that, against a background of declining output, labor 
productivity started to grow rapidly  from  1980, especially in the  manufacturing sector.  For Sachs and 
Brandon (1983) a lot of these productivity gains (as well as of reductions in inflation) simply followed from 
the Thatcher government’s tolerance towards unemployment.  Accordingly, Jeffrey Sachs thinks that the 
UK government was simply playing with its “sacrifice ratio”,  even though he acknowledges rational 
expectations issues. 
Forysth (1985) concludes that there is evidence of DD effects, but that it is impossible to measure 
the precise impact of the booms on structural change.  In particular, North Sea oil was imposed on a poor 
macroeconomic background, and Forsyth thinks that, to some extent, the United Kingdom appeared to be 
exacerbating the structural effects by spending its oil revenues too fast. 
Looking back to Figures I and II we can compare the experience of The United Kingdom during 
the early 1980s with that of other main European countries.  While the share of manufacturing exports in 
GDP fell in the United Kingdom, this experience also bears a lot of resemblance to that of its main EC 
trading partners.  However, manufacturing exports intensity seemed to have dipped further than in the other 
three countries, possibly reflecting the highest relative importance of mineral rents in the UK. 
In Figure II, manufacturing exports for the same four countries in real 1995 dollars also dips more 
markedly than in The Netherlands, Germany and France.  This provides for a check on Figure I where it 
might be argued that the share of manufacturing exports in GDP declined because rents boosted GDP with AN EMPIRICAL TEST OF THE DUTCH DISEASE HYPOTHESIS 
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possibly no effects on exports per se.  Figure II suggests that such is not the case.  Yet, France, not a net 
energy exporter, also experienced a sharp dip in the early 1980s. 
Developing countries 
Regarding LDCs, there have also been numerous country case studies.  A few  authors  have case-studied 
countries in parallel.  McMahon (1997) reviews the results of eight different studies focused on developing 
countries.  The main conclusion of his  paper is that the DD does not spell doom.  Instead doom is generated by 
economic policies that are inappropriate to begin with, or by inadequate policy responses to a resource boom. 
Many authors simply  find little evidence of a  DD in many  of their  case studies (Gelb 1988, 
Cuddington 1989, Davis 1983)  except in the sense that resource booms allow governments to go on with 
counter-productive policies for longer than otherwise (Auty 1993 and 1994, Collier and Gunning 1996).  Most 
governments were able to tax away the largest part of the resource rents
7.  The experience of these countries 
was, according to these authors, otherwise very analogous to that of other countries that had import substitution 
strategies in the 1970s. 
Gelb (1988) and Spatafora and Warner (1999, 2001) analyze the performance of oil boom countries.  
Gelb (1988) case-studies these countries in parallel.  Spatafora and Warner (1999, 2001) is the work that is 
closest to what is undertaken here.  Their dataset in made of 18 oil countries observed between 1965 and 
1989.  These authors all find that favorable terms-of-trade shocks boost non-tradable output but that DD 
effects are remarkably lacking.  This paper will reach opposite conclusions essentially because my dataset, 
by including resource importers as well, controls much better for the counterfactual case of absence of 
boom; in other words I propose a much more powerful test.  I will return to this later. 
In Kazakhstan (Kuralbayeva, Kutan, and Wyzan 2001), Kuwait (Looney 1991), Nigeria, Mexico, 
Venezuela (Roemer 1985) and Saudi Arabia (Looney 1989) exchange rate appreciation followed oil boom s.  
Authors generally argue that this appreciation possibly caused contraction of industrial output as compared 
to the no-boom counter-factual.  However, in Kuwait, Nigeria, Indonesia and Mexico, the growth rate of 
the manufacturing sector was actually greater than or equal to that of non-tradables.  In Venezuela, all 
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sectors grew slowly but with a non-tradable sector only growing at a yearly 5.5%, one cannot characterize 
these symptoms as typical of the DD, argues Roemer (1985). 
Daniel (1986) contends that t he outcomes of both booms and slumps  are dependent on the 
government’s policies, and hence upon the political process.  Jazayeri (1986) concludes that in Iran and 
Nigeria, the manufacturing sector’s growth rate is not fully consistent with the DD model, unless import 
substitution policies are taken into account.  As Roemer (1985) points out,  trade protection can turn 
manufacturing activities into non-tradables. 
On this account, Indonesia has been the “model pupil” (of the I.M.F.).  Warr (1985) observes that 
in spite of distinctive effects on the domestic prices, it is not clear whether the economy’s structure has 
been affected at all.  Roemer (1994) explains that during the oil boom, the Indonesian government dodged 
the worst impacts of Dutch disease thanks to careful exchange rate management.  Indonesia devalued its 
exchange rate periodically during its petroleum boom.  In 1986, a crawling peg was officially adopted and 
the rupiah kept its real value long after. 
The effect of booms in other primary commodities has also been investigated.  Most studies are 
inconclusive while Columbia seems to be the exception (Cuddington, 1989, Davis, 1983).  Kamas (1986) 
and Roca (1999) examine the effects of large expansions in coffee (and illegal drug exports) revenues.  As a 
result, the relative price of nontraded output soared and there was a real appreciation of the Columbian 
exchange rate.  The nontraded sector’s growth rate accelerated, while traded output slowed down.  In the 
realm of metals,  Spilimbergo (1999) makes no mention of DD effects and concludes that copper has 
actually helped the Chilean economy on various macroeconomic accounts. 
Economic history 
Finally, the DD hypothesis has also been considered by economic historians.  Forsyth and Nicholas (1983) 
consider the inflow of American treasures into the 16
th century Spain.  They interpret the consequences on 
the Spanish industry in DD terms.  Cairnes (1859) considers the gold discoveries in Australia in the 1850s.  AN EMPIRICAL TEST OF THE DUTCH DISEASE HYPOTHESIS 
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He identified effects on some Australian industries that we would regarded as DD effects nowadays
8.  This 
episode has also been studied more recently by Maddock and McLean (1984). 
Summary 
The general impression that emerges from the empirical DD literature is that there is some evidence, 
although by no means strong, that some countries, specifically oil producers, have shown symptoms of the 
DD.  Most authors struggled to disentangle the  pure  DD effects on the  manufacturing sector  from the 
effects of  trade crunches that follow recessions usually accompanying energy price spikes.  In LDCs, 
authors struggle with disentangling manufacturing trade patterns due to DD effects from the general failure 
of the development of a competitive manufacturing sector, most often policy induced. 
A major problem of current contributions to the literature is that by analyzing each country as an 
independent case study, or at best a subset of mineral countries, one is implicitly discarding very useful 
information, i.e. the controls offered by relatively resource-scare countries.  Further, there is the obvious 
need to control for the economic conditions prevailing in trade partner countries.  Also, resource booms 
tend to cause recessions in resource dependent countries, thus hurting manufacturing exports in these 
countries through what the gravity literature would call the “own-GDP” effect on trade.  This effect will 
make the identification of DD effects in resource abundant countries harder by assimilating their 
experiences with those of resource-abundant countries, hence the need to account for domestic economic 
conditions prevailing in all resource-dependent countries as well. 
The purpose of this paper is precisely to propose a generalized test for the DD.  In a nutshell, I 
want to test for the DD hypothesis as a joint hypothesis for all countries in response to these 
methodological issues.  Econometrically speaking, a bilateral trade flow setup naturally suggests itself.  An 
additional advantage of working with manufacturing export data rather than production data becomes clear 
at this point.  Many developing  countries  have long pursued import-substitution industrial policies, 
allowing inefficient industries to prosper, or at least survive, in spite of their poor productivity performance 
by global standards.  Manufacturing exports, on the other hand, are presumably less amenable to protection.  
                                                                 
8 There is the question of the original filiation of the DD concept. It is well possible that Meade was 
exposed to Cairnes’ work while on his leave in Australia.  This is a pure conjecture on behalf of the author 
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An increase in manufacturing exports is more likely to be indicative of productivity improvement than a 
mere increase in domestic production. 
My empirical question is as follows: controlling for the other empirically relevant determinants of 
trade, do energy exporters tend to export less manufacturing in times of booms (and vice versa)?  To answer 
this question, I need to choose an empirical  model that explains trade flows.  I have chosen the gravity 
model of trade because of its celebrated empirical success.  I would not want to spuriously identify or fail 
to identify a DD effect for failing to model trade in an otherwise convincing manner.  The data used in this 
paper, the gravity model of trade, and the details behind my empirical approach are presented in the 
following section. 
3  Methodology and Data 
I estimate the effect of energy price-led resource-booms on manufacturing trade exploiting.  I use trade data 
that covers most countries for most of the last three decades of the 20
th century.  During the time span 
covered in my sample, 1970-1997, there has been plenty of variability in the real price of energy.  I exploit 
this price variability, in times of boom as well as slump; I allow this variability to affect manufacturing 
exports of net energy exporters as well as of net energy importers. 
Corden (1984) points out that a resource boom can be take place in three different ways: first, 
there can be exogenous technological progress in the booming resource sector; second, the country can see 
the windfall discovery of some natural resources; third, there can be an exogenous rise in the world price of 
a natural resource exported by a country.  This paper focuses on this third kind of price-led natural resource 
boom because of the relative ease with which it can be exogenously identified.  There are thus cases of DD 
that this paper will overlook.  However, the purpose is to show the existence of at least some form of DD, 
in contrast to the  inconclusiveness of the existing empirical literature.  I leave the identification of other 
forms of DD as interesting paths for further research. 
The main strategy of this paper is to regress trade in manufactured goods at the country level on 
net energy exports and to instrument net energy exports with world energy prices.  Of course, many other 
things affect trade.  While these other factor are not of direct interest here, I need to model their effects so 
as to be able to see if there is any remaining role for resource booms and slumps.  Fortunately, the gravity AN EMPIRICAL TEST OF THE DUTCH DISEASE HYPOTHESIS 
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model of international trade is a simple  yet  credible setup for this purpose. The gravity model of 
international trade will allow me to implement my variables without having to worry about a general lack 
of explanatory power on behalf of the rest of the model. 
The rest of this section is organized as follows.  First, the methodology behind the gravity model 
of trade is presented (section 3.1).  Next, I discuss the construction of the variables that will allow testing 
for the DD (section 3.2).    Finally,  I  acquaint the reader with the  rich panel  dataset used in this paper 
(section 3.3). 
3.1  Gravity Methodology
9 
The origin of the gravity model of trade is traced back to Tinbergen (1962) and Pöyhönen (1963) by Rose 
(2000).  The gravity analogy comes from the fact that trade between two countries is modeled as a function 
of their GDP, that is their economic mass, and as a measure the distance between these countries.  Leamer 
and Levinsohn (1995) survey recent empirical contributions to this literature.  Results in this literature are 
systematically consistent, statistically significant and economically meaningful. 
This paper builds upon the empirical credibility of the gravity model of trade.  This model is very 
straightforward and is aimed at modeling empirically the size of international trade between countries.  It is 
amenable to extensions and it has been used to analyze a growing range of issues: the emergence of a yen 
bloc (Frankel and Wei, 1993), the effect of borders on trade (McCallum, 1995), the causal link between 
trade and growth (Frankel and Romer, 1999), departures from the law of one price (e.g., Engel and Rogers, 
1996), and the effect of currency union membership trade (Rose, 2000, Glick and Rose, 2002). 
Some authors have proceeded to provide theoretical justification to the gravity model of trade.  
There are in fact several ways to justify this approach that range from increasing returns goods 
differentiation across countries, monopolistic competition, reciprocal dumping, to cross-country differences 
in factor endowments or technology.    I refer the reader to  Evenett and Keller ( 2002) and Feenstra, 
Markusen and Rose (2001) for recent contributions and references to this question and to Anderson (1979) 
and Bergstrand (1985, 1989) for older contributions and references.   
                                                                 
9 This section’s presentation of the gravity model of trade is strongly inspired by Rose (2000) and Glick 
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The objective of this paper is not to horse-race these different theoretical foundations against each 
other.  The fact that results are not attached to a specific set of assumptions regarding international trade 
increases the results’ generality, as Rose (2000) argues.  Of course, this also implies that this paper sheds no 
light on the relative merits of these different sets of assumptions. 
In this paper, I  focus my attention on manufacturing exports.  This is not unusual at all in the 
literature.   Bergstrand (1989), for example, estimates a similar model down to single digit SITC industry 
groups.  Feenstra, Markusen and Rose (2001) showed that the gravity model can also be derived from 
models of trade in differentiated products (see also Helpman, 1984 and Bergstrand, 1985).  When they 
calibrate their model, they find that differentiated goods give a more solid theoretical validation of the 
gravity model than do commodities.  Since I model m anufacturing exports, my results are on the safe side.  
Finally, I augment the model with a number of extra controls suggested by Rose (2000) and Glick and Rose 
(2002): 










  (1) 
where i and j indicate countries, t indicates time, and the variables are defined as follows: 
 
§  ijt X  is the real value of manufacturing exports from  i (referred later on as the “origin” country) to 
j (the “destination” country) at time t, 
§  it Y  is real GDP of country i in period t, 
§  D  is the distance between i and j, 
§  Lang  is a dummy which is equal to 1 if i and j have a common language, 
§  Cont  is is a dummy which is equal to 1 if i and j share a land border, 
§  FTA  is a dummy which is equal to 1 if i and j belong to the same regional trade agreement, 
§  Landl  is the number of landlocked countries in the country-pair (0, 1, or 2). 
§  Island  is the number of island nations in the pair (0, 1, or 2), 
§  ComCol  is a dummy which is equal to 1 if i and j were ever colonies after 1945 with the same 
colonizer, 
§  CurCol  is a dummy which is equal to 1 if i and j are colonies at time t, 
§  ComNat  is a dummy which is equal to 1 if i and j remained part of the same nation during the 
sample (e.g., France and Guadeloupe, or the UK and Bermuda), 
§  ijt ßDD %  is a vector of resource boom indicators and its corresponding vector of coefficients, to be 
defined below. 
§  ijt e  stands for the other influences on manufacturing exports, assumed to be well behaved. AN EMPIRICAL TEST OF THE DUTCH DISEASE HYPOTHESIS 
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3.2  Dutch Disease terms 
The coefficient vector of interest is  ß
~
, the vector of estimated effects of a price-led resource boom on 
manufacturing trade.  Three different approaches will be taken to define  ijt DD : 
1.  The first approach consists in using the world price of energy.  I discuss below why I can safely 
assume the world price of energy to be reasonably exogenous to any single country’s 
manufacturing exports.  The exogeneity of the dependent variable is the main advantage of this 
approach.  The drawback is that the interpretation of the resulting coefficient is more hazardous.  
This approach will yield an average energy price elasticity of manufacturing exports.  Obviously, 
this elasticity will be an average because we cannot expect a relatively large energy exporter to be 
affected to the same degree as a relatively modest energy exporter by the same change in world 
price of energy. 
2.  Second, I will use total net energy exports from each country on both sides of the manufacturing 
export flows.  The principal advantage of this first approach is the ease of interpretation of results.  
It will yield the net energy export elasticity of manufacturing exports.  The drawback is that I 
cannot rule out reverse causality running from manufacturing exports (and hence, changes in 
manufacturing productivity) towards net energy exports. 
3.  The third and last approach aims at combining the advantages of the two proceeding approaches.  
It consists in using net energy exports instrumented by the world price of energy.  This should 
yield an elasticity whose interpretation is both meaningful and devoid of concerns for reverse 
causality. 
Of course, net energy exporters and importers cannot be expected to be affected the same way by, 
say, a rise in the real price of energy.  In fact, they are expected to be affected in opposite ways.  The effect 
of an energy crisis on a net energy exporter is sometimes referred to as reverse DD effects.  Because of the 
potential mismatch between theoretical models of the DD and the effects to be expected on net energy 
importers, this paper will not estimate reverse DD effects and will hence strictly focus on net energy 
exports and exporters. AN EMPIRICAL TEST OF THE DUTCH DISEASE HYPOTHESIS 
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World price of energy 
The real energy price index is index ed in 1995 dollars.  I take this US dollar world price index  as 
exogenous to any single country.  A few exceptional countries such as Saudi Arabia for oil and Chile for 
copper may cast some doubt on this assumption.  It turns out no single observation nor pair of observations 
exercises a significant effect on the coefficients of interest according to DFBeta statitistics. 
It could be argued that the real price of oil for example is not exogenous to a group of countries 
like OPEC.  The basic problem with the cartel story is exposed most forcefully by Cremer and Salehi-
Isfahani (1989).  Basically, OPEC did not to have the characteristics of an effective cartel.  It was too 
culturally and politically fractious.  In fact, OPEC did not begin to set output quotas until 1982, at a time 
when oil prices had already increased substantially.  In fact, in Section 6.2, I show that the exclusion of the 
Middle-East and Northern African countries does not exercise a significant effect on the coefficient of 
interest according to DFBeta statitistics.  In fact, including these countries in the sample will tend to 
weaken the Dutch Disease coefficients of interest here. 
There remains the question of how to explain the 12-years of rising oil prices.  In the late 70s, 
according to Krugman (2000), economists began to put forward that a large share of this rise was due to 
perverse supply responses.  Cremer and Salehi-Isfahani (1989) emphasize that oil differs from ordinary 
commodities in three important ways: oil is exhaustible, its production is controlled by governments, and 
oil is a major item on the revenue side of oil exporters’ government budgets. 
To circumvent this potential source of endogeneity further, I use a world energy price index rather 
than specific commodity prices.  In any case, it should be noted that our concern should be endogeneity to 
manufacturing exports,  i.e. our dependent variable.  It is unrealistically far fetched to assume material 
endogeneity of real world energy prices to the manufacturing export performance of any specific country or 
cartel of countries.  Historical hindsight reveals that manufacturing export concerns have simply not been 
driving cartel price coordination. 
Energy price-led resource boom variables are constructed in this following way: 
 
it EPE , “energy price exposure”, 
  = 1(i is net energy exporter) x log(real price of energy)  (2) 
In this first approach,  ijtitjt EPEEPE ”- DD
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1213 ijtitjt EPEEPE bb ￿=+ ßDD %   (2’’) 
So that (1) becomes: 















  (1’) 
The Appendix Table documents the resulting classification for net energy exporters.  A potential 
complication is that a country’s “specialization” as a net energy exporter can be endogenous to 
manufacturing exports.  It reasonably safe to assume that the overall status of a country as a net exporter or 
importer of energy or metals is, ceteris paribus, exogenous to its manufacturing exports, and reflects to a 
large degree its geological endowment.  But it is perfectly imaginable that a year-on-year drop in 
manufacturing exports could drive a country to become a net exporter of energy.  While this potential 
limitation is to be acknowledged, concerns are limited by the fact that instrumentation of net energy exports 
(as in the third approach below) strengthens rather than weakens the conclusions of this paper.  In other 
words, endogeneity seems to be working against the conclusions of this paper. 
Net energy exports 
The second approach to the measurement of DD effects consists in using as dependent variables total net 
energy exportsat both ends of the manufacturing exports flow: 
 
it TNEX , “(total) net energy exports”, 
  ijtjitijt
jj
EXEXNEX ”-= ￿￿   (3) 




1213 ijtitjt TNEXTNEX bb ￿=+ ßDD %   (3’’) 
So that (1) becomes: 















  (1’’) 
It is important to note that 
it TNEX  is truncated at zero since this paper does not try to identify 
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Instrumented net energy exports 
The last approach defines  ijt DD  as in (3’) and then consists in instrumenting (total) net energy exports with 
the world price of energy.  Here too, note that  it TNEX  is truncated at zero since this paper does not try to 
identify reverse DD effects as explained above; similarly, the instrument variable, the real price of energy is 
replaced with zero whenever  0 it TNEX £ .  This implies that there are actually two instrument variables, 
each  ( ) 0resp. 0 itjt TNEXTNEX ‡￿‡  
This third approach combines the advantages of the two preceding approaches.  Its interpretation 
will be a straightforward  total  net energy export elasticity of manufacturing exports.  And yet, 
instrumentation by world energy prices will limit worries regarding reverse causality running from changes 
in manufacturing exports to changes in energy exports. 
Estimation procedure 
I followed the norm in the literature by first using ordinary least squares, with robust and clustered standard 
errors (since pairs of countries are likely to be highly dependent across years), with or without year dummy 
variables.  These results are reported in Appendix Table  2.  Relying on clustered OLS results would 
strengthen the conclusions of this paper.  Nonetheless, my preferred estimation strategy lays in panel data 
techniques, given the panel structure of the data used here and for technical reasons that will be expended 
on in Sections 4 and 5.1. 
I use both fixed and random effects estimators extensively below.  I rely on the robust fixed effects 
“within” estimator, which essentially adds a set of country-pair specific intercepts to the equation, and thus 
exploits only the time series dimension of the data set around country-pair averages.  I will also report 
results with and without extra time-dummies aimed at controlling for time trends in the explained and 
explanatory variables.  In section 5, I will present results from sensitivity and outlier analysis as well as for 
panel Tobit models for censored data.  It turns out that my main results are very robust. 
3.3  The Data Set 
The core of the data used in this paper comes from the World Trade Data sets described in Feenstra, Lipsey 
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bilateral trade flows for all countries over 1970-1992, recently updated up to 1997, classified according to 
the Standard International Trade Classification.  98% of all trade is considered to be  covered by this 
database. 
Manufacturing exports are extracted by keeping exports falling under BEA 34-Industry Code 15-
29, and 31 to 34.  The technical reason behind this choice of industrial categories is that I want to keep 
BEA industry categories that a re also classified as manufactured goods  in the ISI classification.  The 
economic rationale behind this choice is that I want a non-arbitrary rule to exclude industries that lay too 
closely to the borderline between the primary and secondary sectors. 
Energy exports are extracted by keeping exports falling under all SITC Code 3XXX,  i.e. all 
categories corresponding to energy production.  For purposes of classification, country i will simply be 
classified as a net energy exporter in period t if  it TNEX , as defined in (3), i.e. total net exports of country i 
in period t is strictly greater than zero.  The series for the world price of energy come from the International 
Financial Statistics (International Monetary Fund 2002).  These are $US nominal indexes with 1995 as base 
year.  The real equivalent of these series is used after deflating the nominal series by the US CPI (most 
commodities are priced in dollars).  Hence, technically, energy price exposure as defined in (2) is computed 
as 
it EPE  = 1( 0 it TNEX > ) x [log(world price of energyt ) – log(CPUS t )] 
The binary variables for common language, sharing a land border, belonging to the same regional 
trade agreement, colonies, having ever been colonies after 1945 with the same colonizer, remaining part of 
the same nation during the sample, the number of landlocked countries in the country-pair, the number of 
island nations in the pair, and distance between counties are all taken from Glick and Rose (2002).  Real 
GDP and population data are taken from the World Bank (2002). 
4  Estimates 
My preferred specification is that of country-pair fixed effects.  Glick and Rose (2002) also recommend this 
approach.  I have also computed OLS results, although they are not the focus of this paper.  Appendix Table 
3 reports these results: the conclusions drawn in this paper would be strengthened by using least squares 
estimation.  The reasons for the preference given to panel estimation techniques are manifold: AN EMPIRICAL TEST OF THE DUTCH DISEASE HYPOTHESIS 
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First, fixed effects (and to a lesser extent random effects) allow me to set aside concerns about 
omitted country pair characteristics.  Time invariant relative factor abundance characteristics of country 
pairs are implicitly controlled for by the fixed effect specification.  Hence, there is no need to worry about, 
for example, the relative energy price exposure or net energy export variables simply picking up the effect 
of some country-pair specific omitted variable that would be highly associated with one of the components 
of this variable.  I return to this issue in the Section 5.1 where I report the sensitivity of the results to the 
introduction of country dummies for the origin or the destination countries.  Second, fixed effects are an 
efficient way to set aside concerns about trade diversion issues. 
Third, a fixed effect specification allows me to make inferences about the effect of resource booms 
on changes in manufacturing exports, rather than cross-country inferences regarding the effect of resource 
abundance on manufacturing export specialization.  The standard interpretation of fixed effects estimates in 
the gravity literature is that they measure the effect of a change in an explanatory variable, here energy 
price  exposure or total net energy exports, on the steady-state  level of the dependent variable, here 
manufacturing exports. 
Finally, I use time-dummies to control for trends in the dependent and independent variables.  
Whenever informative, I will report results with and without these time-dummies.  It turns out that the null 
hypothesis of joint insignificance of time-dummies can always be rejected with very high confidence.  
Their inclusion, however, does not alter the results in any meaningful way.  In the rest of this paper, I will 
report both country-pair fixed and, when informative, random effects.  Random effect estimates allows for 
a check on the robustness of coefficients on country pair characteristics — such as common language — to 
the introduction of  ijt DD .  The coefficients for these country pair characteristics turn out to be robust to the 
introduction of  ijt DD , which is reassuring. 
Estimates will be presented as follows.  I will first report standard gravity model estimates, using 
this paper’s dataset, prior to the introduction of my new DD variables.  The idea is to have a baseline 
against which to compare the following estimates, and to make sure the baseline regressions are 
comparable to those in the existing gravity literature.  Next , I estimate (1’) and (1’’), i.e. my amended 
version of the gravity model incorporating DD effects.  Results for the estimation of (1’’) will be reported AN EMPIRICAL TEST OF THE DUTCH DISEASE HYPOTHESIS 
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with — and, wherever relevant ,  without — instrumenting total net energy exports.  These regressions will 
be referred to as the “benchmark” regressions to which sensitivity and outlier analysis will be applied later. 
4.1  “Baseline” regressions 
Table 1 displays estimates of the gravity model using m y dataset  prior to the introduction of any DD 
variables.  The gravity model  results are standard as well as intuitive.  The model fits the data well, 
explaining from half to two-thirds of the variation in manufacturing trade flows.  The gravity coefficients 
are economically and statistically significant with sensible interpretations.  For instance, economically 
larger and richer countries export more manufactured goods; the further apart, the fewer manufactured 
goods two countries export to each other.  A common language, land border and membership in a regional 
trade agreement encourage manufacturing exports, as does a common colonial history.  Even the same 
nation coefficient is intuitively signed (contrary to Glick and Rose, 2002). 
Note that the coefficient on own-GDP is greater than unity as well as greater than the coefficient 
on partner-GDP as in Feenstra, Markusen and Rose’s (2001) simulations for differentiated goods. These 
authors find that this coefficient consistently rises as they move from homogenous to differentiated goods. 
This is consistent with a stronger home market effect for differentiated goods: manufacturing can move 
from one country to another more easily than production of resource-based homogenous goods 
(commodities) can.  Time dummies cannot be rejected and so will be kept. 
The Breusch-Pagan test for random effects strongly rejects the null hypothesis of no group (i.e. 
country-pair) random effects.  This warrants the panel estimation method adopted throughout this paper.  
Further, the  Hausman test for fixed  vs. random effects strongly rejects the null hypothesis of zero 
correlation between the random effects and the repressors.  This  warrants the preference given to the fixed 
effects method in this paper. 
4.2  “Benchmark” Results 
Starting with Table 2, I introduce resource  ijt DD  in each of its three forms.   In Table 2A, I report first the 
estimates resulting from the introduction of “energy price exposure” variables.  Next, Table 2B reports AN EMPIRICAL TEST OF THE DUTCH DISEASE HYPOTHESIS 
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estimates resulting from the  use of  total net energy exports.  Finally, i n Table 2C are reported results 
corresponding to net energy exports instrumented by the world energy price. 
Energy price exposure 
In Table 2A  estimates corresponding to (1’) are presented.  Here,  ijt DD  consists of  it EPE  and  jt EPE , 
energy price exposure for the origin and destination of the manufacturing export flow, respectively.  
Columns (2A.1) and (2A.3) report random effect estimates, with and without time-dummies, respectively.  
Columns (2A.2) and (2A.4) report fixed effect estimates, with and without time-dummies, respectively. 
The Breusch-Pagan test for random effects again strongly rejects the null hypothesis of no group 
(i.e. country-pair) random effects and the Hausman test for fixed vs. random effects again strongly rejects 
the null hypothesis of zero correlation between the random effects and the regressors.  This is the reason 
why the fixed effects approach is preferred throughout this paper over both random effects and even more 
so, over least squares (see Appendix Table 2).  Also, the hypothesis that all time-dummies are jointly 
insignificant is rejected with a p-value below 1%. 
Looking at all columns, (2A.1)- (2A.4), it appears that e nergy price booms in the origin country 
hurt manufacturing exports while booms in the destination country — by inducing real depreciation — 
actually boost manufacturing exports (in the origin country).  Perhaps surprisingly, without time dummies, 
in Columns (2A.2) and (2A.4), energy booms at the destination are estimated to have a larger impact than 
booms in the origin country (in absolute value.)  Except in (2A.4), random effects without time dummies, 
the hypothesis that the coefficient on the origin variable is equal to minus the coefficient on the destination 
variable cannot be confidently rejected.  Taken together, this is indirect and preliminary evidence for the 
hypothesis that the resource movement effect is dwarfed by spending effects. 
Quantitatively, the energy price elasticity of manufacturing exports is estimated to be quite high.  
The preferred specification (2A.2), fixed effects with time dummies, yields a 95% confidence interval no 
wider than [-.58,-.36] for energy price shocks to the origin, and no wider than [.27, .48] for energy price 
shocks to the destination.  These intervals are tight and provide unambiguous evidence for energy price-led 
DD effects.  These results are economically significant.  All specifications yield a point estimate 
statistically different from zero below a 1% level of significance. AN EMPIRICAL TEST OF THE DUTCH DISEASE HYPOTHESIS 
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Net energy exports 
In Table 2B estimates corresponding to (1’’) are presented.  Here,  ijt DD  consists of  it TNEX  and  jt TNEX , 
(total) net energy exports for the origin and destination of the manufacturing export flow, respectively.  
Columns (2B.1) and (2B.3) report random effect estimates, with or without time-dummies, respectively.  
Columns (2B.2) and (2B.4) report fixed effect estimates, with or without time-dummies, respectively. 
Here too, the Breusch-Pagan test for random effects again strongly rejects the null hypothesis of 
no group (i.e. country-pair) random effects and the Hausman test for fixed vs. random effects again strongly 
rejects the null hypothesis of zero correlation between the random effects and the regressors.  Also, the 
hypothesis that all time-dummies are jointly insignificant is rejected with a p-value below 1%. 
Looking at all columns, (2B.1)-(2B.4), net energy exports in the origin country intuitively hurt 
manufacturing exports while  energy  booms in the destination country actually boost  the origin’s 
manufacturing exports.  In all four specifications, surges in energy exports at the destination are estimated 
to have a larger impact than booms in the origin country (in absolute value.)  Moreover, the hypothesis that 
the coefficient on the origin variable is equal to minus the coefficient on the destination variable can be 
confidently rejected.  This is relatively strong evidence for the hypothesis that the resource movement 
effect is dwarfed by spending effects.  This is consistent with the consensus found in the DD literature. 
Quantitatively, the energy export elasticity of manufacturing exports is estimated to be relatively 
small.  The preferred specification (2B.2), fixed effects with time dummies, yield a 95% confidence interval 
no wider than [-.013,-.006] for energy price shocks to the origin, and no wider than [.016, .023] for energy 
price shocks to the destination.  These intervals are tight and supportive of the existence of unambiguous – 
albeit small – DD effects.  All specifications yield a point estimate statistically different from zero below a 
1% level of significance. 
Instrumented net energy exports 
Finally, in Table 2C estimates corresponding to (1’’) are also presented.  Here,  ijt DD  consists of  it TNEX  
and  jt TNEX , (total) net energy exports for the origin and destination, now instrumented with the world 
price of energy.  This approach combines the advantages of the two preceding approaches.  Its AN EMPIRICAL TEST OF THE DUTCH DISEASE HYPOTHESIS 
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interpretation will be a straightforward net energy export elasticity of manufacturing exports.  And yet, 
instrumentation by world energy prices will limit worries regarding reverse causality running from changes 
in manufacturing exports to changes in energy exports.  Columns (2C.1) and (2C.3) report random effect 
estimates, with or without time-dummies, respectively.  Columns (2C.2) and (2C.4) report fixed effect 
estimates, with or without time-dummies, respectively. 
Once again, the Breusch-Pagan test for random effects strongly rejects the null hypothesis of no 
group (i.e. country-pair) random effects and the Hausman (I) test for fixed vs. random effects again strongly 
rejects the null hypothesis of zero correlation between the random effects and the regressors.  Again, the 
hypothesis that all time-dummies are jointly insignificant is rejected with a p-value below 1%.  Another 
Hausman test (II) is run to see if instrumented results systematically differ from the non-instrumented 
results reported in Table 2B.  The results do differ systematically and significantly in all cases (2C.1-4), 
indicating that instrumented results are to be preferred. 
After instrumentation, net energy export increases in the origin country still  intuitively hurt 
manufacturing exports while booms in the destination country actually boost manufacturing exports.  But in 
this case, in all four specifications, surges in energy exports at the origin are estimated to have at least as 
large an effect as booms in the destination country (in absolute value.)  With time-dummies around, the 
hypothesis that the coefficient on the origin variable is equal to minus the coefficient on the destination 
variable cannot be confidently rejected.  However, without time-dummies, this hypothesis is confidently 
rejected whereas the point estimate for the effect on the origin is clearly larger in absolute value than the 
point estimate on the destination. 
Quantitatively, the energy export elasticity of manufacturing exports turns out to be economically 
significant.  The preferred specification (2C.2), fixed effects with time dummies, yield a 95% confidence 
interval no wider than [-.10,-.06] for energy price shocks to the origin, and no wider than [.06, .11] for 
energy price shocks to the destination.  These intervals are tight and supportive of the existence of 
unambiguous DD effects  All specifications yield a point estimate statistically different from zero below a 
1% level of significance.  These point estimates and their corresponding confidence interval are an order of 
magnitude higher than when net energy exports are not instrumented. AN EMPIRICAL TEST OF THE DUTCH DISEASE HYPOTHESIS 
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Summary 
In all three cases, using energy price exposure, or net energy exports, instrumented or not, significant 
evidence is found for DD effects.  The energy price as well as net energy exports both have a significant 
and negative effect on manufacturing exports.  The energy price elasticity of manufacturing exports in 
generally well above .4 (in absolute value).  The energy export elasticity of manufacturing exports is 
around 1% (resp. 2%) at the origin (resp. destination) of the manufacturing export flow.  Once instrumented 
with energy prices, the absolute value of is elasticity generally reaches 8% in the preferred specification at 
both ends of the manufacturing export flow. 
These are economically significant coefficient.  The corresponding confidence intervals are tight, 
implying that we can be confident that the coefficients in question do have the sign that the point estimate 
suggest in all likelihood.  In all cases, (1-4), in all three tables, (2A)-(2.C), tests indicates that fixed effects 
with time-dummies is to be preferred on statistical ground to the other 3 reported specifications, as well as 
to OLS (see Appendix Table 2). 
Further, Hausman tests reveal that “instrumented” coefficient estimates differ systematically and 
significantly from regular panel results.  Hence reverse causality running from manufacturing to energy 
exports seems to be a serious concern.  This may explain why “instrumented” coefficient estimates for 
energy exports are an order of magnitude larger than standard panel coefficients.  A plausible cause for this 
is that changes in omitted variables — say, aggregate productivity shocks — will affect both manufacturing 
and energy exports in the same direction, which leads to expect positive correlation between these two — 
in fact all — types of exports.  Absent control for these omitted variables influencing both the dependent 
and t he independent variables, the error term  and the dependent variable of interest  will not be 
uncorrelated.  However, instrumentation by the world energy price allows extracting from net energy 
exports changes the component that solely has to do with energy  price led booms.  As argued above, 
manufacturing exports in any single country are expected to be exogenous to the world price of energy. 
5  Sensitivity analysis 
In this section, I conduct sensitivity analysis of the benchmark results reported in the previous section.  In 
turn, I will deal with the following issues:  are excluded country-specific characteristics driving the results?  AN EMPIRICAL TEST OF THE DUTCH DISEASE HYPOTHESIS 
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Is trade diversion what explains the identification of the main result of this paper?  What is the impact of 
small observations for manufacturing trade on the  results?  How does exchange rate regime affect the 
results?  And does measuring exports and other economic variables in different currencies affect the 
results? 
5.1  Country specific characteristics and trade diversion 
Countries a re likely to specialize in manufacturing exports, to differing degrees, because of various 
fundamental country characteristics that the gravity model of trade may fail to capture.  This worry arises 
because country-pair fixed effects may not capture well e nough the effect of  country specific omitted 
variables.  One might worry that institutional factors, among other things, are driving the degree of 
specialization in manufacturing exports as well as in resource exports. 
To check for the presence of such bias in the benchmark results, I introduce origin and destination 
dummies into the specification, on top of country-pair fixed effects.  It is not possible to structure the panel 
error term specification around countries rather than country pairs because panel estimation procedures 
typically do not allow repeated time values within the panel. 
To avoid the problem of exhaustion of degrees of freedom (and inversion of near-singular 
matrices), I will only introduce origin and destination country-specific effects in turn.  Also, I need to return 
to the random country-pair effects to further free some degrees of freedom.  The corresponding results are 
reported in Table 3A. 
Origin and destination dummies are always jointly significant at a p-value lower than 1%.  Results 
are somewhat affected by the introduction of country dummies.  The right points of comparison are 
columns (2A.1) in Table 2A, (2B.1) in Table 2B and (2C.1) in Table 2C. 
Let’s first compare columns (3A.1) and (3A.4) with column (2A.1).  The own-GDP coefficient 
increases with the introduction of  origin country dummies and decreases with the introduction of 
destination country dummies.  The  partner-GDP coefficient decreases with the introduction of  origin 
country dummies and increases with the introduction of destination country dummies.  Comparing (3A.2) 
and (3A.3) with (2B.2), and (3A.5) and (3A.6) with (2C.2) leads to the same observations.  It is beyond the 
scope of this paper to draw inferences concerning the gravity model of trade from these observations. AN EMPIRICAL TEST OF THE DUTCH DISEASE HYPOTHESIS 
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In the case of the introduction of origin country dummies, the absolute value of the coefficient on 
energy price exposure for the origin is weakened by 2 percent from 0.49 up to 0.47.  The coefficient on net 
energy exports at the origin is unchanged  with and without instrumentation.  As for the destination 
coefficient it is actually strengthened by one percent in the case of energy price exposure, unchanged in the 
case of net energy exports and weakened by one percent in the case of instrumented net energy exports. 
In the case of the introduction of destination country dummies, the absolute value of energy price 
exposure for the destination is weakened this time by 8 percent from 0.46 to 0.38.  The absolute value of 
the coefficient on net energy exports is weakened by one percent without instrumentation and by 2 percent 
from when instrumented by world energy price.  The origin coefficient is barely affected. 
I conclude that, the  introduction of  origin and destination country dummy variables from the 
benchmark specifications, while statistically warranted, is not worth the corresponding loss of degrees of 
freedom (that cost the ability to use the recommended country-pair fixed effect setup), all the m ore given 
their modest quantitative impact on the coefficients of interest. 
There is an interesting byproduct to these results.  The question is:  Are energy exporter simply 
diverting their manufacturing exports towards countries with respect to which they are  not subject to the 
same type of shocks (specifically,  other  energy exporters).  This issue is not specific to resource price 
shocks and has come to haunt many results derived with the use of gravity models, in particular those 
regarding the so-called border effect. 
Anderson and Van Wincoop (2001) most forcefully make this point.  They point out that “the 
theory, first developed by Anderson (1979), behind the gravity model of trade tells that after controlling for 
size, trade between two regions is decreasing in their bilateral barriers relative to the average barrier of the 
two regions to trade with all their partners.” 
Feenstra (2002) identifies two possible remedies to this type of problem.  One is the use of 
country-pair fixed effects, as is done throughout this paper.  The other is the introduction of  explicit 
multilateral resistance terms.  He concludes that both approaches yield consistent estimates of the border 
effect at stake in this literature. 
The advantage of the multilateral resistance term is that it generates more consistent estimates 
whereas the advantage of the fixed effect approach is its obvious simplicity.  Overall, Feenstra (2002) AN EMPIRICAL TEST OF THE DUTCH DISEASE HYPOTHESIS 
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concludes that “since the fixed effects method produces consistent estimates of the average border effect 
across countries, and is easy to implement, so it might be considered to be the preferred empirical method.” 
In any case, t he fact that the conclusions derived from benchmark results  withstand the 
introduction of origin or destination dummies is reassuring with respect to trade diversion issues.  Indeed, if 
these issues plagued the benchmark results, say by resulting in an omitted multilateral DD term, one would 
expect the introduction of country specific dummies to have a marked effect on the energy price or net 
energy exports coefficients. 
In other words if there was systematic trade diversion in the case of energy exporters, then 
controlling for country characteristics, and hence energy export specialization, should have had a major 
impact of DD coefficients.  Reassuringly, there is no such major effect.  This is not to say that no diversion 
is taking place but, rather, that it does not affect the main conclusions of this paper. 
5.2  Censoring Data 
The next issue I deal with is that of small observations.  Observations of very small manufacturing exports 
between countries are not conceptually very different from absence of manufacturing trade between these 
same countries.  This raises the issue of the potential importance of treating these observations differently, 
i.e. as censored observations, than the larger manufacturing exports observed elsewhere.  To tackle this 
issue, tobit censored regressions naturally suggest themselves.  Here,  manufacturing export observations 
below 1 million 1995 dollars have been censored as non-observations.  Table 3B reports panel tobit results 
with or without time dummies, for energy price exposure and net energy exports. 
The right points of comparison are columns (2A.1) & (2A.3) in Table 2A, and (2B.1) & (2B.3) in 
Table 2B.  It appears from the comparison of (2A.1) with (3B.1), (2A.3) with (3B.2), (2B.1) with (3B.3), 
and (2B.3) with (3B.4) that censoring small observations has little impact on results.  DD coefficient 
estimates strengthen in the case of energy price exposure in (3B.1) and (3B.2) and are unchanged in the 
case of total net energy exports in (3B.3) and (3B.4).  This is remarkable given that there are as many as 
25,464 censored observations. AN EMPIRICAL TEST OF THE DUTCH DISEASE HYPOTHESIS 
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5.3  Currency Definition 
Table 3C tabulates key results when instead of working in real (1995) US dollars, all economic variables 
are evaluated instead in the origin country’s currency or the destination country’s currency.  Benchmark 
results in US dollars are reproduced for comparison purposes.  The transformation of the dollar figure is 
done using the real exchange rate index with 1995=100 as base year.  Foreign currency variables are 
evaluated in 1995 US dollar equivalents.  In any case, country pair dummies would absorb the effect of 
differing currency units, so there is no concern about changing the country pair base unit of measurement. 
Measuring economic variables in the origin’s currency improves the linear fit and m easuring 
economic variables in the destination’s currency further improves the linear fit.  All coefficients remain 
highly significant despite small changes in the magnitude of the coefficients for energy price exposure 
(3C.1-2) and instrumented net energy exports (3C.3-4).  The Hausman test indicates that instrumented 
results are to be preferred to non-instrumented results regardless of the currency unit of measurement. 
In short, changing currency units for economic variables does not affect key results.  The US 
dollar benchmark results are kept as a  benchmark because it is the standard approach in the gravity 
literature, and there are obvious benefits to working in a third country’s currency as it avoids some of the 
interpretation problems associated with potentially volatile exchange rates. 
5.4  Instrumenting aggregate income 
Table 3D tabulates key results when domestic and trade partner’s aggregate income are instrumented to 
deal with the possibility that reverse causality running from manufacturing to aggregate income is biasing 
the coefficients of interest.  Columns (3D.1), (3D.2), and (3D.3) report coefficients for fixed effects 
estimates with time dummies for energy exposure, net energy exports and instrumented net energy exports 
respectively.  Columns (3D.1), (3D.2), and (3D.3) should be respectively compared to columns (2A.2), 
(2B.2) and (2C.2). 
The new first stage variables used to instrument aggregate income and the two  countries’ 
population size.  The first thing to note is that a Hausman test confidently rejects the null hypothesis of no 
systematic variation between the instrumented results and benchmark results.  This result lends support to 
the idea that manufacturing exports play a systematic role for economic development. AN EMPIRICAL TEST OF THE DUTCH DISEASE HYPOTHESIS 
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The coefficients on domestic and partner income are weakened in all three cases.  This is 
consistent with a positive effect of manufacturing exports on domestic income, and hence this lends some 
support to authors who are worried about DD effects on productivity and growth.  I leave this as an 
interesting question for future research.  As for the coefficients on DD variables, they are either unchanged 
or strengthened.  There is thus no concern with this type of endogeneity as far as the conclusions of this 
paper are concerned. 
6  Outlier analysis 
This section takes on a couple of issues similar to that of the previous section.  The question asked here is 
slightly different though:  Is the inclusion of a specific group of observations driving the results in any 
meaningful way?  This section will consider two important types of country groupings and their influence 
on the benchmark estimates.  First, the effect of the inclusion of some  exchange rate regimes will be 
investigated.  Second, the effect of the inclusion of geographical areas will be considered. 
6.1  Exchange Rate Regime 
Let’s first pay attention to one important aspect of the policy context in which energy booms take place.  
Real exchange rate appreciation is thought to be the principal mechanism of operation of the DD, so it 
makes sense to take a look at exchange rate regimes as a way to see how the results are affected by policy.  
Broda (2001) revisits the question of the relative merits of exchange rate arrangements for cushioning real 
shocks.  He concludes that floating exchange rates work best for shielding against this type of shocks.  It 
should be noted that this cushioning works precisely by affecting the terms of trade and hence trade itself. 
It is often pointed out in the DD literature that regarding oil booms, one  should expect resource 
movement effects to be shadowed by spending effects because of the “enclave economy” characteristics 
and high capital intensity of oil exploitation activities.  The earlier finding that DD effects are of similar 
magnitude at the origin and destination is consistent with the consensus in the DD literature.  It follows that 
we expect the role of the real exchange rate to be important. 
Chen and Rogoff (2002) revisit the PPP puzzle in three OECD economies (Australia, Canada, and 
New Zealand) where primary commodities represent a significant portion of their exports.  For Australia AN EMPIRICAL TEST OF THE DUTCH DISEASE HYPOTHESIS 
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and New Zealand especially, they find that the price of their commodity exports — which they also take to 
be generally exogenous to these small economies  — has a strong and stable influence on their real 
exchange rate, although this is not enough to explain the PPP puzzle.  Figure III shows graphical evidence 
of this using my dataset. 
Therefore, in Table 4A, I exclude from the sample origin and destination countries which have 
exchange rate regimes that I classify either as “effective floats” or “effective fixers”.  Data on exchange rate 
regimes is taken from Ghosh, Gulde, Ostry, and Wolf
10 (1996).  They categorize regimes according to both 
the publicly stated commitment of the central bank (their de jure classification) and the observed behavior 
of the exchange rate (their de facto classification). 
Neither approach is fully adequate.  A country that declares to have a pegged exchange rate might 
in fact proceed to frequent changes in parity.  Conversely, a country might experience very small exchange 
rate movements, even though the central bank has no formal requirement to uphold parity.  I mimic Broda’s 
(2001) approach and mix both criteria: I classify as either “effective floaters” or “effective fixers” countries 
that have not only a publicly stated commitment to such regime but also that have been observed not to 
manage their currencies, or to abstain from frequent adjustments, respectively.  All other cases are lumped 
into a large ‘intermediate’ category. 
The exclusion of floating or fixing origin as well as destination countries only has a marginal 
effect on the coefficient for DD variables.  Most of the corresponding DFBetas do not get near or above 2 
in absolute value  despite the fact that we are discarding a  non-negligible number of observations in each 
case.  The only two exceptions are the cases of excluding origin counties with an effective floating or fixed 
exchange rate regime.  Yet, excluding either of these exchange rate regimes would actually strengthen the 
conclusion reached in this paper. 
This is why none of these groups of countries is hereafter excluded from the sample.  I do not 
attempt to derive any policy implications from these results.  The only significant DFBetas are 
contradictory in their interpretation.  In any case, the ability to maintain a certain type of exchange rate 
regime may well depend itself on the absence of DD shocks.  Besides, the country’s choice of its exchange 
                                                                 
10 I am thankful to Professor Holger Wolf from Center for German and European Studies, School of 
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rate regime is possibly endogenous to the nature of the shocks facing the country, making causal inferences 
very dangerous. 
6.2  Geographical Areas 
The second issue this section tackles with is that of the impact on estimates of the exclusion of entire 
geographical entities.  I divide the world as the World Bank (2002) does:  I classify all countries into eight 
non-overlapping and exhaustive geographical areas: East Asia and Pacific, Eastern Europe & Central Asia, 
Middle East & Northern Africa, South Asia, Western Europe, Northern America, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin 
America  &  the Caribbean.  Table 4B reports the estimates and DFBetas statistics  corresponding to the 
exclusion of the corresponding countries from the sample.  These statistics have been computed for the 
energy price exposure and net energy exports. 
There are few cases where the exclusion of a whole geographical impacts significantly the 
coefficient on energy price exposure and instrumented net energy exports.  The exclusion of East Asia and 
Pacific weakens the coefficient on energy price exposure and (instrumented) net energy exports for the 
origin.  The exclusion of Latin America and the Caribbean also weakens the coefficient on energy price 
exposure and instrumented net energy exports for the origin. 
As for the exclusion of any other group, the result is either an insignificant DFBeta or a negative 
DBeta, in which case the exclusion of the corresponding group of countries would actually strengthen the 
conclusions of this paper.  Interestingly the “Middle East & Northern Africa” area does not seem to have 
much of an effect on the results. 
For the sake of the generality of the test proposed here, I keep these two groups in the dataset used 
to derive benchmark results.  However, I want to highlight these observations as an interesting path for 
further research.  In other words, why have “East Asia & Pacific” as well as “Latin America & the 
Caribbean” been apparently so sensitive to Dutch Disease shocks?  And why has Sub-Saharan Africa been 
conversely relatively insensitive to them?  The answer may well simply be that to be subject to the DD, a 
country must obviously have some non-negligible amount of manufacturing activity to loose. AN EMPIRICAL TEST OF THE DUTCH DISEASE HYPOTHESIS 
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7  Conclusion 
Acknowledging  potential  endogeneity issues of commodity exports to manufacturing trade, world real 
energy prices are used to identify price led resource booms.  Indeed, world commodity prices can be safely 
assumed to be exogenous to any single country’s manufacturing exports. 
With this identifying assumption in hand, the  world energy price elasticity of manufacturing 
exports in net energy exporters is estimated to be minus .49 for shock taking place at the origin of the 
manufacturing flow, and .46 for shocks taking place at the destination of this flow.  In other words, a one 
percent increase in the price of energy will, everything else held constant, and on average, decrease a net 
energy exporter’s real manufacturing exports by  about half  a percent.  Correspondingly, a one percent 
increase in world energy price affecting the destination will boost the origin’s manufacturing exports by 
.38% in the preferred specification. 
Of course, the effect of an energy boom will depend on the relative importance of this shock to the 
economy in question.  To facilitate interpretation, a second type of elasticity is estimated: the total net 
energy export elasticity of manufacturing exports.  Once instrumented by world energy prices, this 
elasticity is estimated to be minus 0.08 both for shock taking place at the origin of the manufacturing flow  
and .for shocks taking place at the destination of the flow of manufacturing goods.  In other words, a one 
percent increase in the total net energy exports of a country will, everything else held constant, hurt this 
country’s real manufacturing exports by .08 percent.  Similarly, a one percent increase in the destination 
country’s net energy exports will boost the origin’s manufacturing exports also by .08% in the preferred 
specification. 
These elasticity estimates are highly significant and the corresponding confidence intervals are 
tight.  Results are robust to the introduction of country specific fixed effects, alleviating concerns about 
trade diversion issues.  Results are not dependent on the presence or treatment of small export observations, 
nor to changes in the currency unit of measurement. 
Reassuringly,  results are not significantly affected by any country unit; and further, the main 
conclusion of this paper is not dependent on any specific group of countries.  Yet, the sensitivity of East 
Asia and the Pacific as well as of Latin America and the Caribbean, and the insensitivity of sub-Saharan 
Africa to the DD of is highlighted as an interesting path for further research. AN EMPIRICAL TEST OF THE DUTCH DISEASE HYPOTHESIS 
Page 37 of 43 
The main result found in this paper is somewhat surprising in the current state of the DD literature.  
I find strong evidence of the DD in the World Trade Data.  Energy-price led booms have systematically 
tended to hurt energy exporters’ manufacturing exports.  In contrast with the existing literature, this paper 
puts aside doubts about the empirical relevance of the DD, particularly regarding energy exporters.  It is 
intuitive, however, that by juxtaposing the marginally convincing evidence found in numerous countries, 
one should be able to either reject or accept the DD hypothesis. 
It is important not to over-interpret the results of this paper.  Booms are known to result in 
increased GDP levels, and hence  aggregate welfare, for energy producing nations.  This paper is not 
disputing this fact.  Further, one only needs to worry about the DD  to the extent  that there  is in  fact 
something desirable about having a large proportion of manufacturing exports.  Indeed, productivity growth 
can sometimes be very strong in resource extraction industries.  Similarly, the role  played by the 
manufacturing sector compared to the primary sector  can vary from country to country, among other 
reasons because of the possibility of factor intensity reversal. 
In contrast, in the structural tradition of the development literature, it is typically assumed that 
industrialization is key to  the goal of  economic development.  More recently,  authors like  Matsuyama 
(1992), as well as Sachs and Warner (1995, 1999) explicitly model economic growth as a function of the 
relative size of the manufacturing sector.  It is not the purpose of this paper to settle this issue.  Rather, the 
statistic and economic significance as well as the robustness of results found here lead me to argue in favor 
of careful future empirical testing of the effect of sectoral changes in output and exports, specifically those 
resulting from energy booms, on productivity and growth. AN EMPIRICAL TEST OF THE DUTCH DISEASE HYPOTHESIS 
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Real Energy Price (base 1995=100)
Manufacturing Trade Weighted Real Exchange Rate Index (base 1995=100)Table 1: Gravity model regressions 
 
Dependent Variable:  Real manufacturing trade between 
country of origin and country of destination 
 
 








  (1.1)  (1.2)  (1.3)  (1.4) 
1.32  1.90  1.35  1.44  Log real GDP of 
origin  (0.01)***  (0.02)***  (0.01)***  (0.02)*** 
0.80  1.40  0.83  0.99  Log real GDP of 
destination  (0.01)***  (0.02)***  (0.01)***  (0.02)*** 
-1.23    -1.25    Log of distance 
(0.03)***    (0.03)***   
0.64    0.65    1 (Common Language) 
(0.06)***    (0.06)***   
0.37    0.35    1 (Common Border) 
(0.13)***    (0.13)***   
0.82    0.73    1 (Regional 
Trade Agreement)  (0.11)***    (0.11)***   
1.07    1.16    1 (Common colonizer) 
(0.07)***    (0.07)***   
1.46    1.41    1 (Colonial 
relationship)  (0.16)***    (0.16)***   
2.26    2.34    1 (Same nation in the 
sample)  (0.43)***    (0.43)***   
-0.15    -0.12    # of land-locked 
countries in pair  (0.04)***    (0.04)***   
Constant  -39.40  -77.53  -40.50  -56.57 
  (0.37)***  (0.81)***  (0.32)***  (0.34)*** 
Time dummies  p(F)=.00  p(F)=.00  Excluded  Excluded 
Observations  135,947  137,650  135,947  137,650 
Country pairs  9,651  10,137  9,651  10,137 
R-squared  0.64  0.51  0.64  0.52 
Breusch and Pagan  p(
2 c )=.00    p(
2 c )=.00   
Hausman  p(
2 c )=.00    p(
2 c )=.00   
 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Estimated coefficients and standard errors are not reported for time dummies, 
instead the p-value of a joint significance test is reported. 
Random and fixed effects grouped on country-pairs. Table 2A: Benchmark estimates: 
Energy price exposure 
 
Dependent Variable:  Real manufacturing trade between 
country of origin and country of destination 
 








  (2A.1)  (2A.2)  (2A.3)  (2A.4) 
1.31  1.91  1.34  1.46  Log real GDP of 
origin  (0.01)***  (0.02)***  (0.01)***  (0.02)*** 
0.80  1.39  0.83  0.98  Log real GDP of 
destination  (0.01)***  (0.02)***  (0.01)***  (0.02)*** 
-1.23    -1.25    Log of distance 
(0.03)***    (0.03)***   
0.64    0.65    1 (Common Language) 
(0.06)***    (0.06)***   
0.37    0.35    1 (Common Border) 
(0.12)***    (0.13)***   
0.82    0.72    1 (Regional 
Trade Agreement)  (0.11)***    (0.11)***   
1.07    1.16    1 (Common colonizer) 
(0.07)***    (0.07)***   
1.46    1.41    1 (Colonial 
relationship)  (0.16)***    (0.16)***   
2.26    2.34    1 (Same nation 
in the sample)  (0.43)***    (0.43)***   
-0.15    -0.13    # of land-locked 
countries in pair  (0.04)***    (0.04)***   
-0.49  -0.47  -0.45  -0.34  Energy price 
exposure (origin)  (0.06)***  (0.06)***  (0.05)***  (0.05)*** 
0.46  0.38  0.51  0.53  Energy price 
expos. (destination)  (0.05)***  (0.05)***  (0.05)***  (0.05)*** 
H0: orgin = - dest.  p(F)=.71  p(F)=.24  p(F)=.32  p(F)=.00 
Constant  -39.35  -77.48  -40.54  -56.77 
  (0.36)***  (0.81)***  (0.32)***  (0.34)*** 
Time dummies  p(F)=.00  p(F)=.00  Excluded  Excluded 
Observations  135,947  137,650  135,947  137,650 
Country pairs  9,651  10,137  9,651  10,137 
R-squared  0.64  0.52  0.64  0.52 
Breusch and Pagan  p(
2 c )=.00    p(
2 c )=.00   
Hausman  p(
2 c )=.00    p(
2 c )=.00   
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
For time dummies, the p-value of a joint significance test is reported. 
Random and fixed effects grouped on country-pairs. Table 2B: Benchmark estimates (continued) 
Net energy exports 
 
Dependent Variable:  Real manufacturing trade between 
country of origin and country of destination 
 








  (2B.1)  (2B.2)  (2B.3)  (2B.4) 
1.31  1.90  1.34  1.44  Log real GDP of 
origin  (0.01)***  (0.02)***  (0.01)***  (0.02)*** 
0.79  1.39  0.82  0.98  Log real GDP of 
destination  (0.01)***  (0.02)***  (0.01)***  (0.02)*** 
-1.22    -1.24    Log of distance 
(0.03)***    (0.03)***   
0.63    0.64    1 (Common Language) 
(0.06)***    (0.06)***   
0.36    0.35    1 (Common Border) 
(0.12)***    (0.12)***   
0.84    0.74    1 (Regional 
Trade Agreement)  (0.11)***    (0.11)***   
1.06    1.14    1 (Common colonizer) 
(0.07)***    (0.07)***   
1.46    1.41    1 (Colonial 
relationship)  (0.16)***    (0.16)***   
2.23    2.31    1 (Same nation 
in the sample)  (0.42)***    (0.42)***   
-0.15    -0.12    # of land-locked 
countries in pair  (0.04)***    (0.04)***   
-0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  Net energy exports 
(origin)  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)*** 
0.03  0.02  0.03  0.02  Net energy exports 
(destination)  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)*** 
H0: orgin = - dest.  p(F)=.00  p(F)=.00  p(F)=.00  p(F)=.02 
Constant  -39.05  -77.39  -40.18  -56.50 
  (0.36)***  (0.81)***  (0.31)***  (0.34)*** 
Time dummies  p(F)=.00  p(F)=.00  Excluded  Excluded 
Observations  135,947  137,650  135,947  137,650 
Country pairs  9,651  10,137  9,651  10,137 
R-squared  0.64  0.52  0.64  0.52 
Breusch and Pagan  p(
2 c )=.00    p(
2 c )=.00   
Hausman  p(
2 c )=.00    p(
2 c )=.00   
 
Standard errors in parentheses - significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1% 
Estimated coefficients and standard errors are not reported for time dummies, 
instead the p-value of a joint significance test is reported. 
Random and fixed effects grouped on country-pairs. Table 2C: Benchmark estimates (continued) 
Net energy exports (instrumented) 
 
Dependent Variable:  Real manufacturing trade between 
country of origin and country of destination 
Endogenous variable:  Net energy exports 
Instrument variable:  Energy price exposure (origin and destination) 
 








  (2C.1)  (2C.2)  (2C.3)  (2C.4) 
1.30  1.91  1.32  1.44  Log real GDP of 
origin  (0.01)***  (0.02)***  (0.01)***  (0.02)*** 
0.79  1.38  0.81  0.93  Log real GDP of 
destination  (0.01)***  (0.03)***  (0.01)***  (0.02)*** 
-1.23    -1.23    Log of distance 
(0.03)***    (0.03)***   
0.64    0.64    1 (Common Language) 
(0.06)***    (0.05)***   
0.36    0.34    1 (Common Border) 
(0.12)***    (0.12)***   
0.83    0.77    1 (Regional 
Trade Agreement)  (0.11)***    (0.11)***   
1.05    1.12    1 (Common colonizer) 
(0.07)***    (0.07)***   
1.50    1.44    1 (Colonial 
relationship)  (0.16)***    (0.15)***   
2.24    2.27    1 (Same nation 
in the sample)  (0.42)***    (0.41)***   
-0.17    -0.13    # of land-locked 
countries in pair  (0.04)***    (0.04)***   
-0.08  -0.08  -0.07  -0.05  Net energy exports 
(origin)  (0.01)***  (0.01)***  (0.01)***  (0.01)*** 
0.10  0.08  0.11  0.14  Net energy exports 
(destination)  (0.01)***  (0.01)***  (0.01)***  (0.01)*** 
H0: orgin = - dest.  p(F)=.36  p(F)=.98  p(F)=.03  p(F)=.00 
Time dummies  p(F)=.00  p(F)=.00  Excluded  Excluded 
Observations  135,947  137,650  135,947  137,650 
Country pairs  9,651  10,137  9,651  10,137 
R-squared  0.65  0.52  0.65  0.53 
Breusch and Pagan  p(
2 c )=.00    p(
2 c )=.00   
Hausman I  p(
2 c )=.00    p(
2 c )=.00   
Hausman II  p(
2 c )=.00  p(
2 c )=.00  p(
2 c )=.00  p(
2 c )=.00 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
For time dummies and the constant, 
the p-value of a joint significance test is reported. 
Random and fixed effects grouped on country-pairs. Table 3A: Sensitivity Analysis 
Origin and Destination country dummy variables 
 
Dependent Variable:  Real manufacturing trade between country of origin and country of destination 
   














  Origin Fixed Effects  Destination Fixed Effects 
  (3A.1)  (3A.2)  (3A.3)  (3A.4)  (3A.5)  (3A.6) 
1.91  1.90  1.91  1.30  1.30  1.90  Log real GDP of 
origin  (0.02)***  (0.02)***  (0.02)***  (0.01)***  (0.01)***  (0.02)*** 
0.78  0.77  0.77  1.38  1.39  0.77  Log real GDP of 
destination  (0.01)***  (0.01)***  (0.01)***  (0.02)***  (0.02)***  (0.01)*** 
-0.46  --  --  -0.48  --  --  Energy price 
exposure (origin)  (0.06)***      (0.06)***     
0.47  --  --  0.38  --  --  Energy price 
expos. (destination)  (0.05)***      (0.05)***     
--  -0.01  -0.08  --  -0.01  -0.08  Net energy exports 
(origin)    (0.00)***  (0.01)***    (0.00)***  (0.01)*** 
--  0.03  0.09  --  0.02  0.08  Net energy exports 
(destination)    (0.00)***  (0.01)***    (0.00)***  (0.01)*** 
 
[Unreported country-pair specific variables] 
Time dummies  p(F)=.00  p(F)=.00  p(F)=.00  p(F)=.00  p(F)=.00  p(F)=.00 
Origin dummies  p(F)=.00  p(F)=.00  p(F)=.00  Excluded  Excluded  Excluded 
Destination dummies  Excluded  Excluded  Excluded  p(F)=.00  p(F)=.00  p(F)=.00 
R-squared  0.74  0.74  0.74  0.67  0.67  0.67 
 
Standard errors in parentheses - significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Estimated coefficients and standard errors are not reported for time dummies, instead a the p-value of a 
joint significance test is reported.  Random effects grouped on country pairs. Table 3B: Sensitivity Analysis 
Censoring small export observations 
 
Dependent Variable:  Real manufacturing trade between 
country of origin and country of destination 











  (3B.1)  (3B.2)  (3B.3)  (3B.4) 
1.35  1.35  1.30  1.32  Log real GDP of 
origin  (0.01)***  (0.01)***  (0.00)***  (0.00)*** 
0.85  0.81  0.82  0.75  Log real GDP of 
destination  (0.01)***  (0.00)***  (0.01)***  (0.01)*** 
-1.39  -1.39  -1.16  -1.09  Log of distance  
(0.01)***  (0.01)***  (0.01)***  (0.01)*** 
0.49  0.32  0.63  0.67  1(Common Language) 
(0.03)***  (0.03)***  (0.03)***  (0.03)*** 
0.24  0.21  0.78  0.90  1(Common Border) 
(0.04)***  (0.05)***  (0.04)***  (0.04)*** 
0.44  0.41  0.89  0.92  1(Regional Trade 
Aggreement)  (0.04)***  (0.05)***  (0.04)***  (0.04)*** 
0.97  0.92  0.97  1.05  1(Common conlonizer) 
(0.04)***  (0.04)***  (0.05)***  (0.04)*** 
1.81  1.43  1.66  2.08  1(Colonial 
relashionship)  (0.00)  (0.04)***  (0.05)***  (0.00) 
3.46  1.19  3.45  0.93  1(Same nation in the 
sample)  (0.08)***  (0.00)  (0.08)***  (0.00) 
-0.21  -0.20  -0.22  -0.11  # of land-locked 
countries in pair  (0.03)***  (0.02)***  (0.02)***  (0.02)*** 
-0.46  -0.50  --  --  Energy price 
exposure (origin)  (0.05)***  (0.05)***     
0.56  0.54  --  --  Energy price 
expos. (destination)  (0.05)***  (0.04)***     
--  --  -0.01  -0.01  Net energy exports 
(origin)      (0.00)***  (0.00)*** 
--  --  0.03  0.03  Net energy exports 
(destination)      (0.00)***  (0.00)*** 
Time dummies  p(F)=.00  Excluded  p(F)=.00  Excluded 
Uncensored obs.  110,483  110,483  110,483  110,483 
Censored obs.  25,464  25,464  25,464  25,464 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
***significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Time-dummies are included in all regressions but Estimated coefficients 
and standard errors are not reported for time dummies, 
All observations below 1 million 1995 dollars have been censored 
 Table 3C: Sensitivity Analysis; 
Currency definition 
 
Dependent Variable:  Real manufacturing trade between 
country of origin and country of destination 
 
Method of estimation: 













  (2A.2)  (3C.1)  (3C.2)  (2C.2)  (3C.3)  (3E.4) 
1.91  0.98  0.83  1.91  1.00  0.84  Log real GDP 
of origin  (0.02)***  (0.02)***  (0.02)***  (0.02)***  (0.02)***  (0.02)*** 
1.39  0.57  0.31  1.38  0.56  0.27  Log real GDP 
of destination  (0.02)***  (0.02)***  (0.02)***  (0.03)***  (0.02)***  (0.02)*** 
-0.47  -0.22  -0.43  --  --  --  Energy price 
exposure (origin)  (0.06)***  (0.06)***  (0.06)***       
0.38  0.43  0.57  --  --  --  Energy price 
expos. (destination)  (0.05)***  (0.05)***  (0.05)***       
--  --  --  -0.08  -0.06  -0.09  Net energy exports (origin) 
(instrumented)        (0.01)***  (0.01)***  (0.01)*** 
--  --  --  0.08  0.12  0.18  Net energy exports (destination) 
(instrumented)        (0.01)***  (0.02)***  (0.02)*** 
Constant  -77.48  -37.06  -26.02  -77.46  -37.18  -25.43 
  (0.81)***  (0.37)***  (0.34)***  (0.85)***  (0.39)***  (0.36)*** 
Time dummies  p(F)=.00  p(F)=.00  p(F)=.00  p(F)=.00  p(F)=.00  p(F)=.00 
Observations  137,650  134,771  134,864  137,650  134,771  134,864 
Country pairs  10,137  10,012  10,013  10,137  10,012  10,013 
R-squared  0.52  0.61  0.63  0.52  0.62  0.64 
Hausman  --  --  --  p(F)=.00  p(F)=.01  p(F)=.00 
 
Standard errors in parentheses- * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
For time dummies, the p-value of a joint significance test is reported. 
Currency conversion done using a real exchange rate index with base 1995=100 Table 3D: Sensitivity Analysis 
Net Energy Exports – IV regressions 
 
Dependent Variable:  Real manufacturing trade between 
country of origin and country of destination 
 
Endogenous variables:  Log real GDP of origin and destination (and net 
energy exports in 3D.3) 
 
Instrument variables:  Population of origin and destination (and energy 
price exposure in 3D.3) 
 
Method of estimation: 
IV Fixed Effects 
(3D.1)  (3D.2)  (3D.3)+ 
1.88  1.86  1.77  Log real GDP of origin 
(0.13)***  (0.13)***  (0.13)*** 
1.10  1.13  1.23  Log real GDP of 
destination  (0.14)***  (0.14)***  (0.14)*** 
-0.47  --  --  Energy price 
exposure (origin)  (0.06)***     
0.41  --  --  Energy price 
expos. (destination)  (0.06)***     
--  -0.01  -0.08  Net energy exports 
(origin)    (0.00)***  (0.01)*** 
--  0.02  0.09  Net energy exports 
(destination)    (0.00)***  (0.01)*** 
Constant  -69.99  -70.08  -70.44 
  (4.38)***  (4.39)***  (4.49)*** 
Time dummies  p(F)=.00  p(F)=.00  p(F)=.00 
Observations  137,650  137,650  137,650 
Country pairs  10,137  10,137  10,137 
R-squared  0.52  0.53  0.53 
Breusch and Pagan  p(
2 c )=.00  p(
2 c )=.00  p(
2 c )=.00 
Hausman  p(
2 c )=.00  p(
2 c )=.00  p(
2 c )=.00 
 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Estimated coefficients and standard errors are not reported for time dummies, 
instead the p-value of a joint significance test is reported. 
Fixed effects grouped on country-pairs. Table 4A: Outlier Analysis: 
Exchange Rate Regime 
 
Dependent Variable:  Real manufacturing trade between 




















  (4A.1)  (4A.2)  (4A.3)  (4A.4)  (4A.5)  (4A.6)  (4A.7)  (4A.8) 
1.95  2.03  1.96  1.87  1.97  2.01  1.97  1.87  Log real GDP 
of origin  (0.03)***  (0.03)***  (0.03)***  (0.03)***  (0.03)***  (0.03)***  (0.03)***  (0.03)*** 
1.35  1.38  1.38  1.40  1.34  1.39  1.37  1.41  Log real GDP 
of destination  (0.03)***  (0.02)***  (0.02)***  (0.03)***  (0.03)***  (0.03)***  (0.03)***  (0.03)*** 
-0.52  -0.68  -0.50  -0.42  --  --  --  --  Energy price 
exposure (origin):1  (0.06)***  (0.06)***  (0.06)***  (0.06)***         
0.36  0.42  0.41  0.31  --  --  --  --  Energy price 
expos. (destin.):2  (0.06)***  (0.06)***  (0.06)***  (0.06)***         
--  --  --  --  -0.11  -0.12  -0.09  -0.08  Net energy exports 
(origin):1          (0.01)***  (0.01)***  (0.01)***  (0.01)*** 
--  --  --  --  0.08  0.09  0.10  0.07  Net energy exports 
(destination):2          (0.01)***  (0.01)***  (0.01)***  (0.01)*** 
DFBeta 1  -.92  -3.81  -.67  .88  -2.61  -3.61  -1.23  .83 
DFBeta 2  -.29  .93  .64  -1.24  -.01  .72  1.19  -1.15 
Time dummies  p(F)=.00  p(F)=.00  p(F)=.00  p(F)=.00  p(F)=.00  p(F)=.00  p(F)=.00  p(F)=.00 
Observations  115,002  118,710  116,499  114,707  115,002  118,710  116,499  114,707 
Country pairs  9,913  9,681  9,917  9,675  9,913  9,681  9,917  9,675 
R-squared  0.48  0.54  0.50  0.52  0.49  0.54  0.51  0.53 
 
Method of estimation: Country pair fixed-effects grouped on country-pairs. 
 
Standard errors in parentheses - * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Estimated coefficients and standard errors are not reported for time dummies, 
instead the p-value of a joint significance test is reported. 
DFBeta is for energy price exposure or net energy exports; underlined DFBetas are significant Table 4B: Outlier analysis: 
Excluding Geographical Regions 
 



























  (4B.1)  (4B.2)  (4B.3)  (4B.4)  (4B.5)  (4B.6)  (4B.7)  (4B.8) 
-0.16  -0.52  -0.41  -0.50  -0.47  -0.57  -0.65  -0.22  Energy price 
exposure (origin)  (0.06)***  (0.06)***  (0.06)***  (0.06)***  (0.07)***  (0.06)***  (0.06)***  (0.06)*** 
DFBeta  5.41  -.95  1.02  -.58  .012  -1.74  -3.32  4.37 
0.38  0.36  0.40  0.34  0.35  0.36  0.43  0.42  Energy price 
expos. (destin.)  (0.06)***  (0.05)***  (0.05)***  (0.05)***  (0.07)***  (0.05)***  (0.05)***  (0.05)*** 
DFBeta  .07  -.40  .40  -.65  -.56  -.39  1.01  .79 
-0.03  -0.09  -0.08  -0.09  -0.14  -0.09  -0.09  -0.05  Net energy exports 
(origin)  (0.01)***  (0.01)***  (0.01)***  (0.01)***  (0.02)***  (0.01)***  (0.01)***  (0.01)*** 
DFBeta  5.31  -.80  .42  -.30  -5.88  -1.09  -1.18  3.35 
0.09  0.08  0.09  0.07  0.10  0.08  0.09  0.10  Net energy exports 
(destination)  (0.01)***  (0.01)***  (0.01)***  (0.01)***  (0.02)***  (0.01)***  (0.01)***  (0.01)*** 
DFBeta  .49  -.56  .17  -.98  1.07  -.18  .54  1.28 
Time dummies  p(F)=.00  p(F)=.00  p(F)=.00  p(F)=.00  p(F)=.00  p(F)=.00  p(F)=.00  p(F)=.00 
Observations  116,608  135,905  123,066  130,768  121,671  136,132  126,942  131,670 
Country pairs  8,931  10,019  9,032  9,677  10,018  10,130  9,939  10,013 
 
Method of estimation: Country pair fixed-effects grouped on country-pairs. 
 
Standard errors in parentheses - * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Estimated coefficients and standard errors are not reported for time dummies, 
instead the p-value of a joint significance test is reported. 
DFBetas are for energy price exposure or net energy exports; underlined DFBetas are significant Country Name 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97
Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . -1 . . . . . . . . -1 -1 . . . -1 . . 1 -1
Albania 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 -1 1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1
Algeria 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Angola 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Argentina -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Australia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 -1 1 1 -1 1 1 1 -1 1 1 1 1 1 1 -1 1 1 -1 -1 1 1
Austria -1 -1 -1 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
Bahamas, The -1 1 1 1 -1 1 1 -1 1 1 -1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 -1 -1 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
Bahrain 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 -1 1 1 1 1 1 . 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 -1 -1 1
Bangladesh . . . -1 . -1 -1 -1 -1 . . -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
Barbados -1 -1 -1 . -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 -1 -1 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
Belgium -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
Belize . . . -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 . -1 -1 . -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
Benin -1 . -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 . 1 1 1 1 .
Bhutan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -1 . . . . . 1 1 1 1 1 -1 -1 .
Bolivia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 -1
Brazil -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
Brunei . . . . . . . . 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Bulgaria -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
Burkina Faso . . . . . . . . -1 -1 -1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 -1
Burundi . . . . . . . . -1 -1 . . . . . -1 . . . . . . . . . . 1 .
Cambodia -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 . . . . . -1 . . . . . . . . . -1 . -1 -1 -1 . -1
Cameroon -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Canada 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Central African Republic . . . . . . . . . . . -1 . . . . . . 1 -1 . 1 . -1 -1 -1 -1 .
Chad . . . . . . . . . . . . -1 . -1 . . . . -1 . . . . . -1 . .
Chile -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
China 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
Colombia 1 1 1 1 1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Comoros . . . . . . . . . . . -1 . . . . . . . . . . -1 . . . . .
Congo, Rep. . . . . . . . . 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 . 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Costa Rica -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
Cote d'Ivoire -1 -1 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 1 1 -1 -1 -1 1 -1 1
Appendix Table 1: Net energy exporting and importing country classificationCyprus . . -1 . -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
Czech Republic 1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 -1 -1 1 1 1 1 -1 -1 -1
Denmark -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 -1
Djibouti . . . . . . . . . -1 . . -1 -1 . -1 -1 . . . . . -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 .
Dominican Republic -1 . . . . -1 . -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 . -1 . -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
Ecuador -1 -1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 -1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
El Salvador -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
Equatorial Guinea . . -1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 . 1 1 1
Ethiopia -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 . -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 . -1 -1 . -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
Fiji -1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 -1 -1 1 -1 . -1
Finland -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
France -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
Gabon 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 . 1 1
Gambia, The . . . . . -1 . -1 -1 -1 . . . . . . . -1 . . . . . . -1 -1 . .
Germany -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
Ghana -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 . -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
Greece -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
Grenada . . . . . -1 . . . -1 . . . . . . . . -1 . . . . . . . . .
Guatemala -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
Guinea . -1 . . . . -1 -1 . . . -1 . . . -1 . -1 . . . . . -1 -1 -1 -1 1
Guinea-Bissau . -1 -1 . -1 -1 . -1 -1 -1 . -1 . . -1 -1 -1 . -1 . -1 -1 -1 . . -1 -1 .
Guyana -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 . . -1 . . . . . -1 . -1 . . -1 .
Haiti . . . . . . . . . . . . -1 -1 . -1 . . . -1 . -1 . . . -1 -1 .
Honduras -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 . -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
Hungary -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 -1 -1 -1
Iceland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -1 . . -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
India -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
Indonesia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Iraq 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Ireland -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
Israel -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
Italy -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
Jamaica -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
Japan -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
Jordan -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
Kenya -1 -1 1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 . -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1Kiribati . . -1 . . -1 -1 . . . -1 -1 . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 . . .
Kuwait 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 1 1
Lao PDR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -1 -1 . -1 -1 . -1 1 -1
Lebanon -1 -1 -1 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
Liberia . . -1 -1 -1 -1 . . . . -1 -1 -1 . -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
Libya 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Madagascar -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 . . -1 -1 . -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
Malawi -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 . . . . . . -1 -1 -1 -1
Malaysia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Maldives . . . . . . . . . . -1 -1 . . . . . . . . -1 . . -1 . . . .
Mali -1 -1 -1 1 1 1 1 -1 -1 . . -1 . . . . . . -1 -1 . . . . . -1 -1 -1
Malta -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 -1
Mauritania . . -1 -1 . -1 -1 . -1 . -1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 . -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 . -1 -1
Mauritius . . -1 -1 . -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 . . -1 . . -1 . -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 . -1
Mexico -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Mongolia . . . . . . . . 1 1 . . . . . . . . -1 -1 . . . -1 . 1 -1 .
Morocco -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
Mozambique -1 1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1
Myanmar -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 1 1 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
Nepal . -1 . . . . . . . . . . -1 . . . -1 -1 . . . . . . -1 . -1 .
Netherlands 1 1 1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 1 -1 1 1 -1 1 1 1 1 1 -1 -1
Netherlands Antilles -1 1 1 1 1 1 -1 -1 -1 1 -1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 -1 1 1 -1 1 1 -1 -1
New Zealand -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 . -1 1 1 -1 -1 .
Nicaragua -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 . -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
Niger . . . . . . . . . -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 . 1 -1 -1 . 1 . 1 1 1
Nigeria 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Norway -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 -1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 -1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Oman 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 -1 -1 1 1 1 1
Pakistan -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
Panama -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
Papua New Guinea 1 -1 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 -1 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 1 -1 -1 1 -1 -1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Paraguay . . . -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 . . . -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
Peru -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
Philippines -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
Poland 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
Portugal -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1Qatar 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Romania 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 -1 1 1 1 1 1 1 -1 -1 1 -1 -1 1 -1 -1 -1
Rwanda . . . . . . . . . -1 . . . . . . . . -1 . . . . . . . . .
Saudi Arabia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Senegal -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 . -1 1 -1 . -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 .
Seychelles . . . . . . -1 -1 . . . . . . -1 . . -1 -1 -1 . . . -1 -1 -1 1 -1
Sierra Leone -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 . -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 . . -1 -1 . . -1 -1
Singapore 1 1 1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 1 1 -1 1 1 -1 -1 -1
Somalia . . -1 -1 . . . -1 -1 -1 1 -1 -1 . . -1 -1 . -1 -1 -1 . . -1 . . . .
South Africa 1 1 -1 1 . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 . . . 1 .
Spain -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
Sri Lanka -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
Sudan -1 1 1 1 1 -1 -1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 . -1 -1 -1 . -1 . . . -1 . .
Suriname . -1 . . -1 -1 -1 -1 . -1 . . . . -1 . . -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
Sweden -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
Switzerland -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
Syrian Arab Republic 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Thailand -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
Togo -1 . -1 -1 -1 -1 . -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 . -1 -1 -1 . . -1 -1 -1 -1 . -1 -1 -1
Trinidad and Tobago 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tunisia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
Turkey -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
Uganda . . . . . . -1 -1 -1 -1 . -1 . . -1 . -1 . . . . . -1 . . -1 -1 .
United Arab Emirates 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 -1 1 1 1 1
United Kingdom -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 -1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
United States -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
Uruguay -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
Venezuela 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 -1 1 1 1 1 1
Vietnam -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Yemen, Rep. . . . . . . . . . . -1 -1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Zambia -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 1 . . . -1 -1 . -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
Zimbabwe 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 -1 . . . . -1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 1 -1 -1 . -1 -1 -1 1 -1Appendix Table 2: Clustered OLS results 
 
Dependent Variable:  Real manufacturing trade between 
country of origin and country of destination 
   








  (A2.1)  (A2.2)  (A2.3) 
1.25  1.23  1.26  Log real GDP of 
origin  (0.01)***  (0.01)***  (0.01)*** 
0.73  0.71  0.74  Log real GDP of 
destination  (0.01)***  (0.01)***  (0.01)*** 
-1.14  -1.12  -1.17  Log of distance 
(0.03)***  (0.03)***  (0.03)*** 
0.63  0.59  0.65  1 (Common Language) 
(0.06)***  (0.06)***  (0.06)*** 
0.25  0.21  0.24  1 (Common Border) 
(0.13)*  (0.13)  (0.13)* 
0.84  0.89  0.81  1 (Regional 
Trade Agreement)  (0.09)***  (0.09)***  (0.10)*** 
0.97  0.96  0.97  1 (Common colonizer) 
(0.09)***  (0.09)***  (0.10)*** 
1.41  1.39  1.50  1 (Colonial 
relationship)  (0.15)***  (0.15)***  (0.15)*** 
1.84  1.77  1.89  1 (Same nation 
in the sample)  (0.56)***  (0.57)***  (0.54)*** 
-0.22  -0.19  -0.27  # of land-locked 
countries in pair  (0.04)***  (0.04)***  (0.04)*** 
-1.77  --  --  Energy price 
exposure (origin)  (0.19)***     
0.76  --  --  Energy price 
expos. (destination)  (0.17)***     
--  -0.04  -0.11  Net energy exports 
(origin)    (0.01)***  (0.01)*** 
--  0.11  0.05  Net energy exports 
(destination)    (0.00)***  (0.01)*** 
Constant  -36.52  -35.74  -36.90 
  (0.43)***  (0.43)***  (0.46)*** 
Time dummies  p(F)=.00  p(F)=.00  p(F)=.00 
Observations  135,947  135,947  135,947 
# of clusters  9,651  9,651  9,651 
R-squared  0.64  0.65  0.64 
 
S.e. in parentheses * sign. at 10%; ** sign. at 5%; *** sign. at 1% 
The p-value of a joint significance test is reported for time dummies. 
Observations are clustered on country pairs. 